Accounts of Enola Gay Crew

[lonesoullost3]

Very interesting article with a rarely heard perspective.

They were young men hoping to help end World War II. But to their mission's critics, the crews that dropped the atomic bombs on Japan were part of a war crime.

Three men involved in the attack on Hiroshima shared with the BBC their memories of a day that has stayed with them for 60 years.

Theodore "Dutch" Van Kirk - Navigator
Morris "Dick" Jepson - Weapons test officer
Dr Harold Agnew - Scientist, on observation plane

Theodore "Dutch" Van Kirk, 84

The day before the mission we sat through briefings on Tinian island where they told us who was assigned to which plane, and we ran through what we were going to do.

About 2pm we were told to get some sleep. But I don't know how they expected to tell us were we dropping the first atomic bomb on Japan and then expect us to sleep.

I didn't get a wink. Nor did most of the others. But at 10pm we had to get up again because we were flying at 2.45am.

They briefed us that the weather was good, but they were sending weather observation planes up so we would have the best information on targeting Hiroshima.

We had a final breakfast and then went down to the plane shortly after midnight.

There was a lot of picture-taking and interviewing going on - by the military - and it was a relief to get in the Enola Gay about an hour before we took off.

We flew in low over Iwo Jima while the bomb crew checked and armed Little Boy (the uranium bomb) and once we cleared the island we began climbing to our bombing altitude of just over 30,000 feet.

It was perfectly clear and I was just doing all the things I'd always done as a navigator - plotting our course, getting fixes to make sure we were on course and reading the drifts so we knew the wind speed.

As we flew over an inland sea I could make out the city of Hiroshima from miles away - my first thought was 'That's the target, now let's bomb the damn thing'.

But it was quiet in the sky. I'd flown 58 missions over Europe and Africa - and I said to one of the boys that if we'd sat in the sky for so long over there we'd have been blown out of the air.

Once we verified the target, I went in the back and just sat down. The next thing I felt was 94,000lbs of bomb leaving the aircraft - there was a huge surge and we immediately banked into a right hand turn and lost about 2,000 feet.

We'd been told that if we were eight miles away when the thing went off, we'd probably be ok - so we wanted to put as much distance as possible between us and the blast.

All of us - except the pilot - were wearing dark goggles, but we still saw a flash - a bit like a camera bulb going off in the plane.

There was a great jolt on the aircraft and we were thrown off the floor. Someone called out 'flak' but of course it was the shockwave from the bomb.

The tail-gunner later said he saw it coming towards us - a bit like the haze you see over a car park on a hot day, but moving forwards a great speed.

We turned to look back at Hiroshima and already there was a huge white cloud reaching up more than 42,000 feet. At the base you could see nothing but thick black dust and debris - it looked like a pot of hot oil down there.

We were pleased that the bomb had exploded as planned and later we got to talking about what it meant for the war.

We concluded that it would be over - that not even the most obstinate, uncaring leaders could refuse to surrender after this.

In the weeks afterwards, I actually flew back to Japan with some US scientists and some Japanese from their atomic programme.

We flew low over Hiroshima but could not land anywhere and eventually landed at Nagasaki.

We didn't hide the fact that we were American and many people turned their faces away from us. But where we stayed we were made very welcome and I think people were glad that the war had ended.

Morris "Dick" Jepson, 83

I was a young second lieutenant in the US Air Force and was designated as the weapons test officer on the Enola Gay.

The bomb was designed to detonate when it was about 1,500 feet - or about one-and-a-half seconds - above the ground to ensure the maximum possible destructive range.

To that end it contained a range of radar-designated electronics.

In the run-up to the mission I had spent five months at Harvard and three months at MIT studying radar design.

For several months I worked on developing the electronics that would allow the bomb to detonate above the ground, flying test missions over southern California.

The Manhattan Project [to build the atomic bomb] was compartmentalised so the thousands of people working on it could not know the full details of the plan, but I was in no doubt I was training for an atomic bomb drop.

On the day of the mission, I had to perform some final tests on the electronics that operated the bomb.

There was a box in the plane's forward compartment that connected to the bomb via a cable system.

My final job was to climb down into the bomb bay, crawl around the bomb and manually arm the device. I took out three testing plugs that isolated the bomb and put in three red firing plugs.

The most important thought in my mind was that this would detonate and end the war.

Unlike the others, this was the only combat mission I had been on, but there was only one point when I was apprehensive.

I knew how long it took for the bomb to fall and detonate - 43 seconds - so I counted but nothing happened. I just thought this was devastating.

But in the excitement I had counted too fast. That second, the crew reported a huge flash and it had gone off.

A few seconds later I felt the first blast wave.

There was a second shockwave and I knew by the delay that it had detonated at the right height - and this second wave was the force of the bomb bouncing back off the ground.

Everyone's thoughts turned to what devastation there would have been down below - we all had that thought on our mind because we had seen what the bomb could do.

But it was the right thing to do.

Dr Harold Agnew, 85

I had come from working on the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos and my abiding memory is of it being a very exciting time, working with all the best scientific minds of the day.

I describe myself as a 'grunt' at that time, I did what I was told to do. But I was part of a great undertaking.

For the Hiroshima mission I was on board The Great Artiste, a second B-29 that had tailed the Enola Gay to the bombing zone.

We'd flown alongside them all the way up there and were about four or five miles off to one side of Hiroshima, dropping gauges with parachutes that would measure the yield of the bomb.

After we dropped our gauges I remember we made a sharp turn to the right so that we would not get caught in the blast - but we still got badly shaken up by it.

I don't think anyone realised exactly what would happen. It was the only uranium bomb to be dropped.

My honest feeling at the time was that they deserved it, and as far as I am concerned that is still how I feel today.

People never look back to what led up to it - Pearl Harbour, Nanking - and there are no innocent civilians in war, everyone is doing something, contributing to the war effort, building bombs.

What we did saved a lot of lives in the long run and I am proud to have been part of it.

After the war I returned to the University of Chicago to continue my studies and later rejoined Los Alamos, where I eventually became director of the laboratory.

About three-quarters of the US nuclear arsenal was designed under my tutelage at Los Alamos. That is my legacy.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4718579.stm

And for their joint statement:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4743061.stm

[Nebiki]

Yes it is a interesting view point. It's even more of an interesting view point if you turn the perspective around. The Japanese may be well know for their war crimes but what about America?
Can you justify dropping the Atomic bomb? Something that was so devestating that it has never been repeated, at present day.
Has American ever apologised for droping the Atomic bomb?
Though I found the article interesting. Certainly something to think about.

[lonesoullost3]

Yes it is a interesting view point. It's even more of an interesting view point if you turn the perspective around. The Japanese may be well know for their war crimes but what about America?
Can you justify dropping the Atomic bomb? Something that was so devestating that it has never been repeated, at present day.
Has American ever apologised for droping the Atomic bomb?
Though I found the article interesting. Certainly something to think about.

First, I edited my first post and put the correct link for their joint statement.

The drop the A-bomb vs. prolong-the-war debate, unfortunately, is all based on speculation. There's nothing substantial that can be used in it. All we have is the stats from one side - the side that was used. Can the a-bomb be considered a war crime though? Even now - would it be considered a war crime or just a violation of Anti-Nuclear treaties? Countries are still developing the atomic bomb (and testing them) which suggests that countries don't view it as a war crime. Nevertheless, it is true that the US hasn't offered apologies - and reading the thoughts of the crew it's interesting that they don't think apologies are necessary (of course, they use the speculation debate).

Much like history is written by the victors, so are war crimes. The winning side of a war will always try the otherside for war crimes - not the other way around. Had Germany, Italy, and Japan won WW2 there would definitely be war crime trials against the Allies and people today would be saying "Has Italy ever apologized?". Is it fair? Of course not - but what can you expect.

[Mike Cash]

Yes it is a interesting view point. It's even more of an interesting view point if you turn the perspective around. The Japanese may be well know for their war crimes but what about America?

Of which war crimes are you speaking in particular?


Can you justify dropping the Atomic bomb?

Yes.


Has American ever apologised for droping the Atomic bomb?


I certainly hope not.

[Nebiki]

Sorry to be on your back about this mikecash. Could go into further detail about how, you feel that the dropping of the atomic bomb, can be justified?

[Horizon]

Considering how people are STILL dying from the aftermath, or so I heard on the documentary I watched, I don't particularly think it was justified myself.

As for America apologizing, even if they should, I highly doubt they would...

[Kinsao]

I find it difficult to think about the '... or prolong the war' argument, because of course it's impossible to go back and try the other way :( Personally I feel that the dropping of the A-bomb can never be justified. But I'm not able to put forward a reasoned argument to support my point of view :bluush:

[Mike Cash]

Forgive me for just giving you a link, but I've spent enough Augusts in Japan that I am sick to death of this topic already and really hate typing the same stuff over and over again: http://tinyurl.com/9vc4a

Also, I just had to sit through another session of Japanese television's highly self-serving annual coverage of this dead horse which has continued to be whipped to the point that not a shred of flesh remains on the bones.

[Horizon]

Well, to give for the other argument, I can see perfectly well why it was pretty much necessary as it stopped the Japanese from taking any more action in the war, but, well, it still killed innocent people (and, apparently, is still doing so), so, yeah...That's the thing I have the problem with.

But I can and do definately see both sides here.

Also, thanks for the link. I'm sure they have some good points to say. I'll definately have a read with them so to speak.

[lexico]

The use of the atomic weapon was a necessary moment in history. We have no regrets.
...
[We] pray that reason will prevail among leaders before we ever again need to call upon our nuclear might. There are no regrets. We were proud to have served.When a man has engaged in one action which, at the time of carrying out seemed justified, but later has raised doubts, what choices are laid before him ?

To rationalize. Of course there are other options available to him; to regret the act. But to regret would make him vulnerable not only to criticism from others, but also to criticism coming from himself, his conscience. This will obviously lead to a tormented life. He will find it painful to recall the moment of the action, and the moments that immediately preceded it.

Every time he thinks of the victims, he will surely tremble in agony; at first for himself, for the preservation of his being as a whole person. If the person has the mental capacity to empathise for the victims by going beyond the immediate physical and emotional needs of himself, and of those who surround him, then he might come to terms with the unshakable truth of his failure to live up to a certain idea. Thus abandoning all wishful thinking about what might have been, or what might not have been, he may barely begin to see what inhumanity he has created without making an excuse, without justifying that it was necessary.

But there is also the easier route of escape, esp. if there are those around him who validate, and console; one might even whisper into his ears, "You are not an agressor, but you are the victim. Because of the undue situation created by the other, you were forced into taking that action, and somebody, even if not you, would have had to do the dirty job of dropping the A-bomb. You have done a great service to mankind, and your personal pain of conscience is the burden you bear for all good people of this world."

Even this option of regret-first-affirm-later was way too dramatic an option to be realistic for people like Theodore Van Kirk, Morris Jepson, and Dr Harold Agnew. The weight of practical necessasity is too grave to dwell on "girlie" sentimentalism.

So the most practical choice for them was not to regret, nor to regret-&-excuse, but to fully rationalise. They are proud to have served in the nuclear massacre even to say that they "were able to stop the killing" when in reality death was delivered by their hands to at least 130,000 lives on the morn of August 6, 1945 Hiroshima.

[Void]

there was testing, so certainly there was the idea about how destructive such bomb could be (at least among those giving orders)
http://www.dannen.com/decision/

was it necessary? it still questionable
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm

bombing civilians...
Bombing of Dresden was also to stop the war? Or it`s nothing more but moral terror? Were allies thus any different from fascist Germany or Japan, doing wrong in a name of right?

[Nebiki]

For those who don't know much about the Dresden bombing:
In 1941 Charles Portal of the British Air Staff advocated that entire cities and towns should be bombed. Portal claimed that this would quickly bring about the collapse of civilian morale in Germany. Air Marshall Arthur Harris agreed and when he became head of RAF Bomber Command in February 1942, he introduced a policy of area bombing (known in Germany as terror bombing) where entire cities and towns were targeted.

One tactic used by the Royal Air Force and the United States Army Air Force was the creation of firestorms. This was achieved by dropping incendiary bombs, filled with highly combustible chemicals such as magnesium, phosphorus or petroleum jelly (napalm), in clusters over a specific target. After the area caught fire, the air above the bombed area, become extremely hot and rose rapidly. Cold air then rushed in at ground level from the outside and people were sucked into the fire.

In 1945, Arthur Harris decided to create a firestorm in the medieval city of Dresden. He considered it a good target as it had not been attacked during the war and was virtually undefended by anti-aircraft guns. The population of the city was now far greater than the normal 650,000 due to the large numbers of refugees fleeing from the advancing Red Army.

On the 13th February 1945, 773 Avro Lancasters bombed Dresden. During the next two days the USAAF sent over 527 heavy bombers to follow up the RAF attack. Dresden was nearly totally destroyed. As a result of the firestorm it was afterwards impossible to count the number of victims. Recent research suggest that 35,000 were killed but some German sources have argued that it was over 100,000.
Out of interest, did the British government ever officially apologise for the bombing of Dresden?
A horrible tragedy served without passion, not an ounce of mercy was given to those who resided in Dresden.

[lonesoullost3]

Here's another link article - from the view of a survivor (though not so much a reflection on whether the bomb should be dropped, but rather the relation of an experience).

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4739615.stm

Surviving Hiroshima: Keiko Ogura

Keiko Ogura tried to help the many injured after the bombing
Keiko Ogura was eight years old when the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. She still lives in the city.
I wanted to go to school, but my father said 'I have a very strange feeling today - you shouldn't go to school, stay with us'.

That morning I was on the road near the house and all of a sudden I saw a flash of blueish white light - a magnesium-like flash and soon after a big sound with dust, and I was blown away and fell on the ground.

I found myself lying on the ground near the house. I thought the house was just in front of me but I couldn't see it because everything had become so dark and many pieces of wood and roof tiles and rubbish were falling on my head.

And in the darkness there was a strong, strong wind like a typhoon. I couldn't open my eyes but tried to get back to my house and in the darkness I heard somebody was crying - my brother and sister.

I was 2.4km from the hypocentre but houses nearer the hypocentre had caught fire and were burning.

I saw long lines of refugees, just quiet, I don't know why they were so quiet. There were long lines, like ghosts.

Most of them were stretching out their arms because the skin was peeling off from the tips of their fingers. I could clearly see the hanging skin, peeling skin, and the wet red flesh and their hair was burned and smelled, the burnt hair smelled a lot.

And many people, just slowly passed by the front of my house.

Parched

All of a sudden a hand squeezed my ankle. I was so scared but they said 'get me water'. Almost all the people were just asking 'water', and 'help me'.

I rushed into my home where there was a well and brought them water. They thanked me but some of them were drinking water and vomiting blood and [then] died, stopped moving. They died in front of me. I felt regret and so scared. Maybe I killed them? Did I kill them?

And that night, 6 August, my father was so busy looking after the neighbours, but when he came back he said: 'Listen children - you shouldn't give water, some of the refugees died after drinking water. Please remember that.'

Then I felt so guilty, and I saw them many times in my nightmares. I thought I was a very bad girl - I didn't do what my father said - so I kept it a secret. I didn't tell anybody this story until my father died.

There was black rain falling, black rain mingling with ashes and rubbish and oil, something like that. It smelled bad and there were many spots on my white blouse - sticky, dirty rain.

In the morning people were moving, brushing away flies from their skin. My house was full of injured people.

But as a little girl I was so curious. I wanted to see what the city looked like. My house was at the bottom of a hill - I climbed up the hill, near our house, and then I saw the whole city. I was so astonished - all the city was flattened and demolished. I counted just a couple of concrete buildings.

In denial

The next day some of the buildings were still burning, and the next day, and the next day, and for three or four days I climbed the hill to see what the city was like.

I have a brother-in-law. He was living almost at the centre of the city - his family was very close to the hypocentre. Until now his family members were missing and he didn't want to recognise they were all gone, so he refused to say and report the family's names to the officials and he didn't want to visit Hiroshima.

Right now, he is living far away in Tokyo, and only last year he decided to report to Hiroshima city that his family members - his mother and sister - had passed away.

And there were so many people [who saw] so many dead or dying, but actually, most of them made up their mind not to tell anyone about what they saw.

And from a soldier's view:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4741541.stm
Surviving Hiroshima: Yutaka Nakagawa

Private Yutaka Nakagawa was a 20-year-old soldier and veteran of the Indonesia campaign, stationed in Hiroshima when the bomb fell on 6 August 1945.

I was in the barracks on the night of the 5 August. There was a warning of an air-raid. But I was in bed. A B29 was flying over the city and dropped hundreds of leaflets.

The leaflets said Japan would be defeated. The officers said don't touch the leaflets - they could be poisoned. Our officers collected them up so we didn't read them.

On the night of the 5 August there were warnings of air raids so I had to take our unit's communications equipment to a bunker 2km from our barracks.

All through the night I was moving this equipment so in the morning I was allowed to rest. When the bomb fell I was asleep. But when I awoke I saw the aftermath - some of my fellow soldiers were horribly burned.

In the city, the citizens of Hiroshima were trying to reach the Ota river to drink water. The banks of the rivers were covered with dead bodies.

Cries for water

Some time later I returned to the barracks. Inside the barracks were civilian victims, lying on the ground.

When I approached they cried out for water but our officers said: 'Don't give them water - if you do that they'll die immediately'.

But there was a pond inside the barracks - water reserved for fire-fighting - I saw black, burned bodies in the water - it was like a nightmare.

Even now I cannot believe the things that I saw. There are lots of memorials in Hiroshima - like the atomic bomb dome - but for me the most vivid image of the atomic bomb is the memory of those burned bodies.

[Silverpoint]

For those who don't know much about the Dresden bombing:

Out of interest, did the British government ever officially apologise for the bombing of Dresden?
A horrible tragedy served without passion, not an ounce of mercy was given to those who resided in Dresden.

There was a certain amount of soul searching a few years back in the UK when a statue dedicated to "Bomber" Harris (who masterminded the Dresden campaign) was proposed. A fairly significant proportion of the population came out against it, but the statue was eventually erected. Interesting the epithet under the statue simply reads "The Nation owes them all an immense debt", not actually directly glorifying the individual himself.

Recently Queen Elizabeth II made a trip to Germany in which she gave a vague admission that 'bad things were done by both sides' or something along those lines. I don't believe an official apology has ever been forthcoming though.

[Mike Cash]

I find it extremely interesting that people who look for some act of bombing with which to compare the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki invariably end up discussing Dresden....and practically never make the slightest mention of the horrific fire bombing of Tokyo.

Educate yourselves, if you've never heard of it. Here's a place to start:
http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/tokyo.htm

Not even the Japanese make much mention of it. I doubt that many of the younger generation even know it happened at all. Television and other media here certainly don't make an annual event out of remembering it.

At this point I suppose I could go into the long-winded rant that my wife got subjected to the other day, but I'd rather spend a pleasant day off than piss myself off first thing in the morning.

[lonesoullost3]

I find it extremely interesting that people who look for some act of bombing with which to compare the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki invariably end up discussing Dresden....and practically never make the slightest mention of the horrific fire bombing of Tokyo.

Educate yourselves, if you've never heard of it. Here's a place to start:
http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/tokyo.htm

Not even the Japanese make much mention of it. I doubt that many of the younger generation even know it happened at all. Television and other media here certainly don't make an annual event out of remembering it.

At this point I suppose I could go into the long-winded rant that my wife got subjected to the other day, but I'd rather spend a pleasant day off than piss myself off first thing in the morning.

I think the reason why most people talk about Dresden is because when you think about the major bombing in Japan you think Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hands down they were more devastating than the firebombing. On the flip side, Dresden was the major bombing in Germany. So it's a comparison of the largest attacks in countries that draws people to Dresden, not necessarily ignorance of the Tokyo firebombing.

[Mike Cash]

So we place relative values on human life depending on where the event resulting in its loss stands in the public consciousness rankings? Or in inverse relation to the number of explosive/incendiary devices involved? Or is there some other reason that Japanese media chooses to focus exclusively on the two atomic bombings and the massive suffering and loss of life from them while totally failing to commemorate comparable suffering and death from the Tokyo fire bombings? I say that there is a self-serving political reason for Japan to do so and invite others to give a little thought to guessing what it might be.

[senseiman]

So we place relative values on human life depending on where the event resulting in its loss stands in the public consciousness rankings? Or in inverse relation to the number of explosive/incendiary devices involved? Or is there some other reason that Japanese media chooses to focus exclusively on the two atomic bombings and the massive suffering and loss of life from them while totally failing to commemorate comparable suffering and death from the Tokyo fire bombings? I say that there is a self-serving political reason for Japan to do so and invite others to give a little thought to guessing what it might be.


The obvious answer is that for much of the 60 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki the world has been on the verge of a nuclear holocaust that would have wiped out human civilization as we know it. The conventional bombs dropped on Tokyo, horrendous though they are, don't pose the same total threat to the survivability of our species, so naturally people are much more pre-occupied with the sight of the world's only place where Nuclear weapons were used in anger. You could also notice that the Atomic bombings are widely credited with having ended the war, causing the downfall and discrediting of Japanese militarists and ushering in a whole new era in Japanese history, something which the Tokyo firebombings did not do.

There isn't anything self serving politically for the Japanese government either. The whole spirit of the memorial ceremonies and related media coverage are actually completely at odds with the policies of Junichiro Koizumi's government which is seeking to alter Japan's constitution and forge closer military ties with the US. A lot of it must be quite embarassing for the ruling party.

As for people getting sick and tired of seeing and hearing about Hiroshima I might ask how tired you get of the annual Pearl harbour or D-Day ceremonies and TV coverage in the US, which is every bit as heavy as coverage of the atomic bombings in Japan. The same banal arguments about the value of American lives lost on D-day vs. those lost on some less prominent battlefield like North Africa or Italy apply as the ones about lives lost in Tokyo vs. Hiroshima. In both cases it should be obvious why the media and people focus more on one versus the other. The atomic bombings and D-day are much more important events in historical context than the Tokyo firebombings or Operation Torch.

[Mike Cash]

No points for getting the obvious answer. Try for the unobvious answer.

[GaijinPunch]

The drop the A-bomb vs. prolong-the-war debate, unfortunately, is all based on speculation.

I won't state my opinions on if the bomb was justified or not, but there's not much to speculate on in regards to the "prolonged war theory". Read a book... even written by a Japanese. They weren't going to quit... not anytime soon.

Japanese television's highly self-serving annual coverage of this dead horse which has continued to be whipped to the point that not a shred of flesh remains on the bones.

Indeed. Just be thankful nobody's gone off on the whole "The US tricked Japan into attacking Perl Harbor" tangent.

[Nebiki]

As for people getting sick and tired of seeing and hearing about Hiroshima I might ask how tired you get of the annual Pearl harbour or D-Day ceremonies and TV coverage in the US, which is every bit as heavy as coverage of the atomic bombings in Japan. The same banal arguments about the value of American lives lost on D-day vs. those lost on some less prominent battlefield like North Africa or Italy apply as the ones about lives lost in Tokyo vs. Hiroshima. In both cases it should be obvious why the media and people focus more on one versus the other. The atomic bombings and D-day are much more important events in historical context than the Tokyo firebombings or Operation Torch.
Yeah, I certainly get sick of the annual D-Day celebrations.
The US tricked Japan into attacking Perl Harbor" tangent
Everybody looks for a way to justify their actions. No matter, how strange or perhaps even preposterous, the explanation may be.

[Silverpoint]

but there's not much to speculate on in regards to the "prolonged war theory". Read a book... even written by a Japanese. They weren't going to quit... not anytime soon.

Actually there's plenty to speculate on. Try reading one of the numerous and equally compelling publications which puts a totally different side of the story. The point is, you have no idea whether the war would have continued for a long time, or whether Japan would have surrendered, and neither have I. You're just giving us an opinion based on what you've heard.

Indeed. Just be thankful nobody's gone off on the whole "The US tricked Japan into attacking Perl Harbor" tangent.

Again this is slightly misprepresentative. You state this as if it were almost inevitable, when in fact the theory is so discredited as to be hardly worth commenting on and very few people would be likely to.

[Mike Cash]

I know there are at least three truck drivers on JREF. To translate that into meaningful terms: I know there are at least three conspiracy theorists on JREF.

[Silverpoint]

Are you suggesting JREF is representative of the populous as a whole?

[lexico]

I know there are at least three truck drivers on JREF. To translate that into meaningful terms: I know there are at least three conspiracy theorists on JREF.What is the connection ? Are you implicating anyone in particular, or just inviting people of all professions a/o opinions to the discussion ?

[Mike Cash]

I should have been more clear. The comment was in reference to "...the theory is so discredited as to be hardly worth commenting on and very few people would be likely to." in Silverpoint's post. My point being that as long as there are truck drivers around, there is always somebody ready to discuss a conspiracy, no matter how obscure or discounted it may be.

[ArmandV]

Letter from Truman to Irv Kupcinet, August 5, 1963

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI
August 5, 1963

Dear Kup:

I appreciated most highly your column of July 30th, a copy of which you sent me.

I have been rather careful not to comment on the articles that have been written on the dropping of the bomb for the simple reason that the dropping of the bomb was completely and thoroughly explained in my Memoirs, and it was done to save 125,000 youngsters on the American side and 125,000 on the Japanese side from getting killed and that is what it did. It probably also saved a half million youngsters on both sides from being maimed for life.

You must always remember that people forget, as you said in your column, that the bombing of Pearl Harbor was done while we were at peace with Japan and trying our best to negotiate a treaty with them.

All you have to do is to go out and stand on the keel of the Battleship in Pearl Harbor with the 3,000 youngsters underneath it who had no chance whatever of saving their lives. That is true of two or three other battleships that were sunk in Pearl Harbor. Altogether, there were between 3,000 and 6,000 youngsters killed at that time without any declaration of war. It was plain murder.

I knew what I was doing when I stopped the war that would have killed a half million youngsters on both sides if those bombs had not been dropped. I have no regrets and, under the same circumstances, I would do it again - and this letter is not confidential.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Irv Kupcinet
Chicago Sun-Times
Chicago, Illinois

[Buntaro]

"I knew what I was doing when I stopped the war that would have killed a half million youngsters on both sides if those bombs had not been dropped."

--> It is important that both sides of any issue be understood. This is one side of the issue that has been ignored by many people.

[lexico]

Thanks Mike for explaining; I'm a little slow to grasp. :)

Back on topic: Shall we proceed with the demystifying ? :biggrin:


I have been rather careful not to comment on the articles that have been written on the dropping of the bomb for the simple reason that the dropping of the bomb was completely and thoroughly explained in my Memoirs, and it was done to save 125,000 youngsters on the American side and 125,000 on the Japanese side from getting killed and that is what it did. It probably also saved a half million youngsters on both sides from being maimed for life.Brown University prof. James L. McClain of the history department disproves the verity of Truman's claim to have expected "125,000 deaths and half a million wounded Americans had he not used the atomic bomb." (in paraphrase)

Later Truman and his staff claimed that by dropping the atomic bomb they were able to save other lives. In 1947 Harry L. Stimson who served as Secretary of War in the administrations of Roosevelt and Truman contributed a special report to the The Harper's Magazine stating the official position of the US administrations. He wrote that "the US Airforce alone could have suffered casualties of over one million" in the landings on Kyushu in the fall of 1945 and on Honshu the following spring. ("The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" Harry L. Stimson, The Harper's Magazine, 194:1161, Feb 1947, p. 102)

According to the military tabulation submitted to Pres. Truman in July 1945, however, the expected loss in the US military was at most 33,500 (spelt "thirty-three thousand and five hundred") casualties including the dead, the wounded, and those missing-in-action as a result of a [forecful] landing on Kyushu; therefore the figure of "over one million casuaties" stated by Stimson was in fact absolutely groundless.

retranslated from the Korean edition, 일본근현대사(日本近現代史), James L. McClain, translated by 이경아, Darakwon Publishing Inc., 2002, p. 651, ISBN 89-7255-789-7 04910How could Truman claim to have expected over 625,000 US casualties when the miilitary report forecast only 33,500 ? Does anyone have further information on the military report containing the casualty forecast of 33,500 of July 1945 submitted to then president Truman ?


You must always remember that people forget, as you said in your column, that the bombing of Pearl Harbor was done while we were at peace with Japan and trying our best to negotiate a treaty with them.No, the US was expecting that Japan would probably react to the US trade embargo on scrap-metal, crude oil, rubber, vanadium, molybdenum, and copper by invading southeast Asia to secure these raw materials. In order to do so it was necessary for Imperial Japan to immobilise the US navy, hence the obviously predictable response.

All you have to do is to go out and stand on the keel of the Battleship in Pearl Harbor with the 3,000 youngsters underneath it who had no chance whatever of saving their lives. That is true of two or three other battleships that were sunk in Pearl Harbor. Altogether, there were between 3,000 and 6,000 youngsters killed at that time without any declaration of war. It was plain murder.Can anyone prove that the US military was not aware of the attack on Pearl Harbor prior to the attack ? Can anyone be absolutely sure there were no Japanese radio transmissions picked up by the US military whether plain or encoded ?

I knew what I was doing when I stopped the war that would have killed a half million youngsters on both sides if those bombs had not been dropped.No, this unsubstantiable claim has been disproved above by McClain.

note: I do not have McClains' Japan: A Modern History in English; I have strived to keep the reverse translation literal; I hope someone with access can verify the integrity of McClains' statement only offered in retranslation.


I have no regrets and, under the same circumstances, I would do it again - and this letter is not confidential.


We have no regrets.
...
[We] pray that reason will prevail among leaders before we ever again need to call upon our nuclear might. There are no regrets.Are these four US citizens saying they have(had) no regrets, that they would have done it back then, and that they would do it again in the future if needed ? I see no other way of reading their open letter and statement to the public, and they appear to be open threats to the world.

[senseiman]

No points for getting the obvious answer. Try for the unobvious answer.

So....the obvious and rationale answer isn't what you are looking for? I know, it must be part of the vast Liberal/Democrat/Feminist plot to take over America and force everyone to worship pagan idols while smoking pot and not driving SUVs. Is this the kind of unobvious answer you are looking for or are you even remotely willing to give common sense a chance?

[ArmandV]

Can anyone prove that the US military was not aware of the attack on Pearl Harbor prior to the attack ?


On the other side of the coin, can anyone prove the U.S. was aware an attack was imminent?

Another quote I heard from Truman last night [on the subject of the A-Bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki] on the NBC Nightly News: "I don't care what the crybabies say!"

[ArmandV]

Truman wrote: "I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokyo plain and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost at a minimum a quarter of a million American casualties."

In his biography of Truman, David McCullough says that plans for an invasion were real.

"Nor, it must be stressed, was there anything hypothetical about preparations for the invasion - on both sides - a point sometimes overlooked in later years," he (McCullough) wrote.

"Truman had earlier authorised the Chiefs of Staff to move more than one million troops for a final attack on Japan. Japan had some 2.5 million regular troops on the home islands."

David McCullough argues for a more down-to-earth interpretation of Truman's motives.

"How could a president, or the others charged with responsibility for the decision, answer to the American people if... after the bloodbath of an invasion of Japan, it became known that a weapon sufficient to end the war had been available by midsummer and was not used?"

[GaijinPunch]

You state this as if it were almost inevitable, when in fact the theory is so discredited as to be hardly worth commenting on and very few people would be likely to.

That wasn't the point at all. I was referring to the fact that (I feel) it's a point often beat into the ground. I brought up the subject of "how long the war would've gone on" had there been no bomb dropped to my wife. Her reply was six months. Whether that's long or not is anyone's guess. For a country whose motto was "we'll fight until the last Japanese is dead" one could assume they had at least 6 months left... maybe more.

Whether or not more lives would've been lost is unknown, but had there been a land invasion, more American lives would've been lost, which was probably the largest factor in favor of the A-bomb at the time. Anyways, back to my point, she couldn't let it go. She had to throw in, "America made Japan attack Perl Harbor" to which I just said "but that doesn't make it right" and we left it at that.

[Pachipro]

Just be thankful nobody's gone off on the whole "The US tricked Japan into attacking Perl Harbor" tangent.

Again this is slightly misprepresentative. You state this as if it were almost inevitable, when in fact the theory is so discredited as to be hardly worth commenting on and very few people would be likely to.

I know there are at least three truck drivers on JREF. To translate that into meaningful terms: I know there are at least three conspiracy theorists on JREF.
Thank you MIke!
Quote:
Originally Posted by lexico
Can anyone prove that the US military was not aware of the attack on Pearl Harbor prior to the attack ?


On the other side of the coin, can anyone prove the U.S. was aware an attack was imminent?
I can't prove it, but there is enough documented evidence out there for anyone willing to do the research and have their blinders taken off. Remember one thing about war, history is written by the victors.

America needed to get into the war as a way of getting out of the economic depression they were in for the past 11 years, but the majority of Americans held firm to a “do not get involved,” and isolationist attitude. Something dire had to happen to stir up immediate support for entering the war.

Excerpts from Rule by SECRECY by Jim Marrs. pgs 173-175:

Controversy has raged for years over the question of Roosevelt’s foreknowledge of the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. While incontestable proof remains elusive, the accumulation of available information has now caused widespread acceptance of the idea that the devastating attack was encouraged and tolerated in an effort to galvanize public support for America’s participation in the war.

Those who accept the idea that Roosevelt and a few other insiders knew that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked point to these suspicious facts:

-During Pacific naval exercises in 1932 and 1938, and with Japanese military attaches closely observing, U.S. Navy officers theoretically destroyed the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor both times.

-Roosevelt ordered the Pacific fleet moved to the exposed position at Pearl Harbor over the vigorous objections of Admiral James O. Richardson, who was replaced for refusing to issue the order.

-Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and other high-level officials knew that war was inevitable and that negotiations with Japan’s Kichisaburo Nomura were hopeless since the broken Japanese code revealed that Nomura was instructed not to yield to Hull’s harsh demands.

-They also knew that a large Japanese task force, including six aircraft carriers, had dropped from sight after moving toward America.

-This prompted U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, a close associate to many CFR members, to send an oddly worded message to Pearl Harbor commanders on November 27, 1941, “Hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat CANNOT, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat NOT, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.” Despite this clear warning, with its accompanying suggestion not to attack any attackers, Pacific fleet ships remained at anchor and aircraft were bunched into clusters of “sitting ducks” as “security” against saboteurs.

-During the first week of December, Americans intercepted the Japanese diplomatic “Purple” code ordering their embassy in Washington to destroy *** secret papers and prepare to evacuate.

-On December 4 Australian intelligence reported sighting the missing Japanese task force moving toward Pearl Harbor but Roosevelt dismissed it as a rumor begun by pro-war Republicans.

-A British agent named Dusko Popov learned of Japan’s plans from German sources but his warnings to Washington were ignored.
-According to author John Toland, separate warnings regarding a pending attack on Pearl Harbor, though varying as to a specific time, came from U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew; FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Senator Guy Gillette, Congressman Martin Dies, Brigadier General Elliot Thorpe in Java, and Colonel F.G.L. Weijerman, the Dutch military attaché in Washington. Later Dutch naval officer, Captain Johan Ranneft, said sources in U.S. Intelligence told him on December 6 that the Japanese carriers were onl;y 400 miles northwest of Hawaii.

-During investigations after the attack, Marshall and Navy Secretary Frank Knox both testified they could not recall their whereabouts the night of December 6. It was later revealed that they were both in the White House with Roosevelt.

Then there is the issue of the US aircraft carriers. Not one was present at Pearl Harbor on December 7. That’s because General Billy Mitchell had proven the mid-1920’s that a single bomb-loaded airplane could destroy a battle ship. Battleships were obsolete, but the American military and most of the public still believed that it was the ultimate weapon. Victory in any Pacific war would go to the side with the strongest airpower and that meant aircraft carriers. Thus, the U.S hid theirs from the attack.

Not much here I know. Next I'll post the most damning evidence against Roosevelt as to his foreknowledge of the attack.

[Mike Cash]

So....the obvious and rationale answer isn't what you are looking for? I know, it must be part of the vast Liberal/Democrat/Feminist plot to take over America and force everyone to worship pagan idols while smoking pot and not driving SUVs. Is this the kind of unobvious answer you are looking for or are you even remotely willing to give common sense a chance?

Snide nastiness in response to an expressed opinion one finds to be ludicrous, repugnant, or outrageous I can understand.

Snide nastiness in response to an as-yet unexpressed opinion leaves me scratching my head.

[cicatriz esp]

It's been estimated that a 15 to 20 kiloton fission bomb (like that used on Hiroshima) would destroy 5% of modern day Los Angeles. Not to take away from the severity of what happened at all, but what was used was not the metropolis flattening device most people assume it to have been.

[lexico]

It's been estimated that a 15 to 20 kiloton fission bomb (like that used on Hiroshima) would destroy 5% of modern day Los Angeles.If downtown Los Angeles were 95% wooden structure, and the 5% figure still held together, I'd consider your comparison valid. That coupled with a detonation 550m above downtown Los Angeles for maximum destruction, I wonder what percentage of an area comparable to Hiroshima city would be standing. Your comparison, which is obviously unfair, is cruelly unfair ! Just imagine what kind of chaos would be left under the 42,000 feet of heat pillar; bodies, bodies, bodies ! "I love the smell of napalm." Sorry that was the smell of flesh buring. I don't know who did the simulation on his PC or supercomputer; I think he has a sick mind !!!

[cicatriz esp]

It's not a comparison at all. The 5% figure was for geographical area only, not buildings or people. Don't collude the two.

edit: if i was making any comparison, it was between the nuclear weapons of then and now.

[senseiman]

Snide nastiness in response to an expressed opinion one finds to be ludicrous, repugnant, or outrageous I can understand.

Snide nastiness in response to an as-yet unexpressed opinion leaves me scratching my head.

You ask a question, I spend a fair amount of my time trying to give you an intelligent response which you snidely dismiss with a glib one-liner. What did you expect, a medal?

Please excuse the above nastiness, but if you'd care to share your opinion with us all rather than just dispariging those of others I'd be ever so grateful. I'm not really one to show nastiness to someone who actually goes out on a limb and stakes out and defends his opinions.

[senseiman]

It's been estimated that a 15 to 20 kiloton fission bomb (like that used on Hiroshima) would destroy 5% of modern day Los Angeles. Not to take away from the severity of what happened at all, but what was used was not the metropolis flattening device most people assume it to have been.

If you were to detonate a Hirsohima sized bomb on downtown LA, the number of people killed would almost definitely be greater.

Percentages like that mean nothing. Hiroshima is a very compact city which had a population of 350,000 at the time. LA is a sprawling metropolis with suburbs extending over hundreds of square miles.

[Mike Cash]

You ask a question, I spend a fair amount of my time trying to give you an intelligent response which you snidely dismiss with a glib one-liner. What did you expect, a medal?

I didn't snidely dismiss it at all. I agreed with you that it was the obvious answer and took no issue with anything you said. I thought it was a fine answer. But it didn't address my "I say that there is a self-serving political reason for Japan to do so and invite others to give a little thought to guessing what it might be." comment.


Please excuse the above nastiness, but if you'd care to share your opinion with us all rather than just dispariging those of others I'd be ever so grateful. I'm not really one to show nastiness to someone who actually goes out on a limb and stakes out and defends his opinions.

I not only clearly state my opinions here, I go one step farther and put my real name on them. I certainly don't need to be chided on this point by someone who states his opinions behind the anonymity of a screen name.

I've left the opinion unstated thus far in hopes of seeing if there are those who go beyond the obvious when looking at this issue and seeing what ideas others might have regarding what self-serving interest Japan might have in continuing to focus on the two atomic bombings practically to the exclusion of any other aspect of World War Two and in what way this course may have affected international relations between Japan and her neighboring countries over the last sixty years.

[Nebiki]

Well, with regards to self serving interests, Japan might have.
It is rather hypocritical to expect great things of Japan, especially with international relations, when the west does nothing on the contrary to set an example.
But remeber, this is all just my opinion.
And opposing views on the matter I won't criticize.

[Mike Cash]

And it is rather condescending and patronizing to assume that Japan would need the west to set an example for it.

[Nebiki]

You're entitled to an opinion, yes.
My question is how can you possibly find that patronizing?
You feel that Japan would be any less capable of setting an example, for us?
Isn't that patronizing in itself?
It's also worth noticing that I never made the assumption that Japan would need an example. I merely feel, that, how is it reasonable to expect Japan to come to terms with its neighbours when the west won't even apologise for what was quite possibly one of the most horiffic war crimes ever commited?
While I'm all for you challanging my point of view. I feel you possibly you aren't doing it in the most constructive manner possible.

[Mike Cash]

In what way was it a war crime? And why should "the west" apologize for it?

In case nobody has noticed, my question on this regards the national psyche of Japan regarding the war and has nothing whatsoever to do with the actual bombing itself or it's immediate or delayed aftermath, nor with the justification of using the bomb.

[Nebiki]

To quote a referance:
Approximately 40 percent of Nagasaki was destroyed. Luckily for many civilians living in Nagasaki, though this atomic bomb was considered much stronger than the one exploded over Hiroshima, the terrain of Nagasaki prevented the bomb from doing as much damage. Yet the decimation was still great. With a population of 270,000, approximately 70,000 people died by the end of the year.
You don't consider killing 70,000 people, many whom would have been women and children, a war crime? I'm not saying that other countries haven't produced such terrible tragedies, as I would be lieing my friend ;).
Whether the west should apoligise for it, is left to the individual to decide.
Note: The referance I quoted does not include the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
Perhaps I am a pacifist or maybe I am simply a fool to think such weapons don't have a purpose in this world.

[Silverpoint]

"I knew what I was doing when I stopped the war that would have killed a half million youngsters on both sides if those bombs had not been dropped."

--> It is important that both sides of any issue be understood. This is one side of the issue that has been ignored by many people.

The fact that the bomb (may have) saved many lives is something that is ignored by many people? I can't quite for the life of me understand your reasoning here. This is the specific central argument that the entire debate revolves around. The entire world is aware of it. People may disagree with it, but noone ignores it!

Actually I'd be interested to know if anyone saw the Hiroshima debate programme on TV last night on the "BBC World" channel (I think it was repeated a couple of times). One of the guests was a historian who seemed to have been invited to give an impartial, non-political assessment of the dropping of the atomic bombs. While I don't know her background, she seemed pretty academically minded and not some crackpot conspiracy theorist just invited to spice up the show.

Her assessment? Japan was at the time of the bombing trying to negotiate a surrender. Russia was entering the war against Japan, further deepening the need for the Japanese to find a solution to get out of the situation. She said that if Truman had waited even one week longer, there may never have been a need to drop the bombs. Later when someone suggested that perhaps the reason for dropping the bombs on Japan may have been to "scare Stalin" with whom relations were becoming increasingly strained, she said rather diplomatically that it's not impossible to believe there may be some truth in this idea.

It's true that Japan was at the time, as yet, unwilling to accept a total unconditional surrender entirely on the Allies' terms. What is clear though is that they were keen to negotiate some kind of peace. If a country is unwilling to stop fighting and will continue the war to the last gasp of the last man, this may have been a good reason for dropping the bomb to end things quickly. However, if the reason for dropping the bomb is simply because the country in question wants to negotiate conditions for surrender and doesn't want to 100% accept the terms of the opposing force, I find it pretty disgusting that tens of thousands of civillians were wiped out simply to make a point.

Sadly however, the more you read about this tragic event, the more it appears that may be exactly what happened.

[lexico]

Thanks for posting that, Silverpoint.
To bring in an interesting spin; the US wanted a share of the pie on the Korean peninsula. Time was a deciseive factor that would influence the quality and degree of US occupation of Korea.

1) if IJapan surrendered early; US troops could land and estblish one Martial Command on the Korean Peninsula
2) but IJapan lagged in its surrender; giving troops of the USSR a head start in entering present day N.Korea and Pyongyang, while US troops were still fighting a Pacific War.
3) if the surrender were to be delayed one week or more, the Soviets might "liberate" and take over all of Korea.

It is interesting to note that USSR entered Pyongyang immediately following the surrender in August 1945, while the US arrived two months later in October 1945, causing great confusion. Not to mention a massacre of Korean civilians; the US employed former IJA troops to "mow down" a welcoming Korean crowd between Inchon and Seoul -- the US troops supposedly thought they were an angry crowd of rebels, thus the former-IJA used disinformation to apply one last evil blow on the Koreans !

The point being; the US was under a lot of pressure because it had expected to excercise indisputed influence in this area, but that does not make the use of the atomic bombs justified at all. Greed was behind it.

[Void]

2 Silverpoint
That`s almost exactly what my friend answered me today (he is into Japan studies and can be even considered japanophil). He even said that for Japan war was lost at the end of 1943, and it was just the galvanized corpse aftewards: best military cadre are lost, quality of equipment decreases, China as a primary sourse is cut off, besides regular bombing begins. He said that families on Okinava were given 1 granade per each - to kill themselves (was it?), and there was not enough of food for the army. Besides Soviets (whom Japan considered at least neutral) declared the war.
So, he advised to divide supposed number of loses (without A-bomb) at least on 10.

Even when i was at school some of our history teachers told that A-bombing was rather to threaten USSR

i understand that history doesn`t have subjunctive mood. There enough evidence for both sides - theat the war would go on (6 or so months) or that it could be stopped by diplomatic and economic means.

Whatever...
But by 20ies years such thing as atomic desease was known (Curie died because of it and her notes even today are radiactive), Tests showed that 1 a-bomb was more destructive than conventional. Bombing civilians (wheather it`s Tokio, Hambugh, Hiroshima or Dresden) is still a crime... there is no winner at war, only losers

[senseiman]

I didn't snidely dismiss it at all. I agreed with you that it was the obvious answer and took no issue with anything you said. I thought it was a fine answer.

Glad to hear it, if I misunderstood your intentions I apologize.

But it didn't address my "I say that there is a self-serving political reason for Japan to do so and invite others to give a little thought to guessing what it might be." comment.

Actually, and this is what made me feel you were "snidely dismissing my post", because not only did I quite directly address that comment but I also directly addressed several other points you had brought up. Did you actually read my post?



I not only clearly state my opinions here, I go one step farther and put my real name on them. I certainly don't need to be chided on this point by someone who states his opinions behind the anonymity of a screen name.

Using your real name isn't really called for in forums like this so you don't get any extra points for that. And in fact, as you say you haven't stated your opinion here.

I've left the opinion unstated thus far in hopes of seeing if there are those who go beyond the obvious when looking at this issue and seeing what ideas others might have regarding what self-serving interest Japan might have in continuing to focus on the two atomic bombings practically to the exclusion of any other aspect of World War Two and in what way this course may have affected international relations between Japan and her neighboring countries over the last sixty years.

There are probably a million reasons you could think of for why Japan would focus on the atomic bombings. If you've got some sort of conspiracy theory I'm sure we'd all be interested. You seem convinced that Japan has some unseemly, self serving motive for it. OF COURSE Japan has a self serving motive for it. Every national memorial or ceremony in every country on the planet has a self serving purpose. But that doesn't mean that there aren't a mountain of legitimate, non-self serving motives for it, far more so than most other war memorials IMHO. So by just coyly prodding everybody to tell you what you want to hear its hard to tell if you are just spouting Bull or if you actually have something worthwhile to say.

[Jack]

A bit of a serious discussion here, should america have used the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima?

[cicatriz esp]

If you were to detonate a Hirsohima sized bomb on downtown LA, the number of people killed would almost definitely be greater.

Percentages like that mean nothing. Hiroshima is a very compact city which had a population of 350,000 at the time. LA is a sprawling metropolis with suburbs extending over hundreds of square miles.

And yet, if you removed every single person from LA and detonated the bomb, that percentage would still stand. I was only refering to blast radius and maybe psi as a function of that radius, sorry for the confusion.

[lexico]

To be human is to realise he has a choice -- at all times.
To blame others, the opponent, the soviets, the Nazis, Pearl Harbor, the public outrage, need to save lives, is to close eyes to this human condition and to seek refuge in an easy defense -- like an animal that has no choice.
There was a choice, many choices, and many, many more.
Those are for murder-in-self-defense case arguments -- not for the leading country of the free world.

So let us not put the words in the mouths of respondents by asking should -- this is no catholic mass.
My answer is: no. Using the atomic bombs was not necessary because there were at least several choices laid before the US, but the choices were neglected out of choice, blinded by fear, greed, haste, and expediency.

[nice gaijin]

I'm not a historian, but my thoughts are thus:

to the American leadership, in order to end the war a devastating attack was necessary; something to crush the Japanese morale and make victory seem impossible... dropping the second bomb on Nagasaki was to reinforce that sense of hopelessness, and to give the impression that we had more than just one of these bombs, and that we were willing to continue dropping them until there was no one left to fight...

nevertheless, I never liked the idea of targetting civilians. The major arguments for the decision I can remember are that the Japanese would have continued fighting to the last man and dragged the war on for as long as possible; there couldn't have been the same psychological impact if a different target was picked, and that the Japanese had no qualms about targetting civilians, both in Asia and America. I recognize these arguments and the fact that the war did end very quickly after the bombs dropped, but I don't find any of it real justification or vindication for all thse civilian casualties that week (and all the repercussions thereafter). I've read several accounts of what happened in Hiroshima, the first of which was Sadako's thousand paper cranes, one of the first books I read... I find the first-person accounts of how devastating the bombs were to be the most compelling arguments against ever dropping them again.

to sum up my own feelings, America needed to show it had the power to end the war as quickly as possible, and that's what they did, but I would prefer to think that all those civilian casualties were not necessary as collateral damage.

[Silverpoint]

With the greatest of respect to the original poster, there's a considerably longer and more detailed current thread on this topic entitled "Accounts of Enola Gay Crew" which is (at the moment) sitting near the top of the first page of the forum. Maybe a moderator could join the two or something?

Edit: This post got merged from another thread (in case you're wondering what I'm talking about)

[Iron Chef]

Thread merged.

[vorpar]

"She said that if Truman had waited even one week longer, there may never have been a need to drop the bombs."

This is demonstrably untrue. 3 days before that week was up, the Japanese had successfully tested their own atomic bomb. It was planned to be used on the nearly 1 million person strong invasion of Kyushu.

In hindsight, the bombings turned out to stop the war immediately, but I don't know that I can justify them with the knowledge that they had at the time.

[lexico]

"She said that if Truman had waited even one week longer, there may never have been a need to drop the bombs."This is demonstrably untrue. 3 days before that week was up, the Japanese had successfully tested their own atomic bomb. It was planned to be used on the nearly 1 million person strong invasion of Kyushu.Do you have proof of this ? Even 2ndary that might point to the primary proof ? Anything ?

[vorpar]

Wilcox, Rober K. Japan's Secret War. New York: Marlowe & Co., 1995

Pictorial History of the Second World War, vol. 5. New York: Wm. H. Wise & Co., 1970

Parrott, Lindsay. "Five Cyclotrons Wrecked in Japan." New York Times, Novermber 24, 1945. (additional stories on Nov 26, 29 and Dec 5, 6, 14, and 15.)

The book I'm reading has a photo of one of the cyclotrons being disposed of by the US military. Jack Seward's Strange But True Stories from Japan.

I misquoted also, the invasion force was numbered at 3.5 million.

[Silverpoint]

This is demonstrably untrue. 3 days before that week was up, the Japanese had successfully tested their own atomic bomb. It was planned to be used on the nearly 1 million person strong invasion of Kyushu.


And where exactly was this bomb tested? You need an extremely large amount of space to test a bomb. Testing one in Japan would be nearly impossible due to the densely populated environment. The Japanese were being pinned back on every front, so it's unlikely they could have taken it overseas for testing. I'm curious as to where exactly this device went off and why there is no mention of it in any official records.

The original argument for creating the bomb was because Germany was considered to be close to developing one, so the Allies knew they had to develop the technology first. If there was any real knowledge that the Japanese had a bomb, this would have been a propaganda gift for Truman in his argument for ending the war quickly. Yet, no one at the time, or since in an official capacity has ever used this argument that I'm aware of.

[lexico]

Vorpar:

Thank you for the references. I shall be back to post an argument against what you presented; 3 days before that week was up, the Japanese had successfully tested their own atomic bomb.

It was planned to be used on the nearly 1 million [sic. > 3.5 million] person strong invasion of Kyushu.

[vorpar]

If there was any real knowledge that the Japanese had a bomb, this would have been a propaganda gift for Truman in his argument for ending the war quickly.

I didn't quite say it clearly enough, but they didn't know until after it was tested that Japan had the bomb. It wasn't tested until after the Nagasaki bombing.

It was tested at a research facility in Korea. You're right, they sent the scientists away since nothing could get done during the American bombing.

Debate all that you wish. I myself haven't checked the primary sources, so I don't know the complete accuracy of what I have presented here. I don't mean to offend, I just thought this was an interesting little known tidbit.

I personally think that the use of nuclear weapons was a tragedy, especially against a mostly civilian population. Nobody can accurately predict what Japan would have done with their bomb either, so I'm not saying that it justifies the American bombings.

In any case, it isn't really that far-fetched an idea, considering that Japan was researching fission in the '20s, at the same time numerous other countries were.

[lexico]

While Theodore Van Kirk, Navigator, Morris Jepson, Weapons Test Officer, and Dr Harold Agnew reaffirms the bombimg of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, the Commandar of Enola Gay, Robert Lewis, chooses to differ from their view, as do J Robert Oppenheimer and Dwight Eisenhower.

The Independent Online Edition (http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article303774.ece)
Independent Media TV (http://www.independent-media.tv/item.cfm?fmedia_id=11547&fcategory_desc=Under%20Reported)



'My God, what have we done?' - the commander of the 'Enola Gay'

Sixty years ago tomorrow, the crew of the Enola Gay watched in awe as their payload detonated over the city of Hiroshima. "As the bomb exploded, we saw the entire city disappear," said Commander Robert Lewis. "I wrote in my log, 'My God, what have we done?'"

Below, thousands of people were instantly carbonised in a blast that was thousands of times hotter than the sun's surface; further from the epicentre, birds ignited in mid-flight, eyeballs popped and internal organs were sucked from bodies of victims.

By the end of the day an estimated 160,000 were dead or injured and the bomb's "ghosts" walked the city - thousands of initial survivors who would die within days, often with the word mizu -water - on their lips. Many more subsequently died - and are still dying - from various cancers.

Harry Truman, the then President of the Unites States who had ordered Hiroshima destroyed, later said: "We have discovered the most terrible weapon in the history of the world," but steadfastly defended its use and said it had ultimately saved lives.

In March this year, Paul Tibbets, the pilot of the Enola Gay, also said the bomb had saved lives. Asked whether he had any regrets, he said: "Hell no, no second thoughts. If you give me the same circumstances, hell yeah, I'd do it again."

J Robert Oppenheimer, the brilliant scientist who oversaw the building of the bomb, was more ambiguous about his creation. He famously said after the first test detonation: "Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds."

Truman's successor, President Dwight Eisenhower, also had reservations. In a 1963 interview with Newsweek magazine, he said: "The Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." Some thought that Imperial Japan, like Nazi Germany, deserved what it got for the brutal, relentless bombing of Shanghai and Chongqing, the Rape of Nanjing and other war atrocities across Asia. But others asked where had the moral high ground of the Allies gone since President Franklin D Roosevelt described the 1940 Nazi blitzkrieg of British cities as "inhuman barbarism"?

"No one seemed conscious of the irony," wrote the US historian Howard Zinn. "One of the reasons for the general indignation against the fascist powers was their history of indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations."

Tomorrow morning, Hiroshima will sidestep the endless debates over whether the bombing was justified and concentrate on commemorating the victims, in a ceremony swelled by thousands of foreign visitors and dominated by fresh concerns that the world is forgetting the lessons learnt here.

"I'm less resentful about what happened in Hiroshima than I am about America's wars today," says Kazuko Kojima, who was born two days after the bomb fell, in a cellar filled with the dead and dying victims. "Why don't they stop? Aren't there better ways to solve problems? The reason people go to war is because they don't understand the feelings of others."

Article Length: 448 words (approx.)(c) 2005 Independent News & Media (UK) Ltd.

[Silverpoint]

It was tested at a research facility in Korea. You're right, they sent the scientists away since nothing could get done during the American bombing.


I'm not saying you're completely wrong, but the balance of probability would lead me to believe that this isn't a true account. Recently a "historian" in the UK published a book claiming that Germany had also developed a bomb, but his arguments were widely discredited. He put up what seemed like a reasonably sound argument to someone reading his book. But when you looked at the bigger picture, he had been incredibly selective with the truth in order to build a case.

Korea, China et. al. need no excuses to criticize Japan's wartime atrocities. If there had been any testing of nuclear weapons on Korean soil, I'm pretty sure it would be at the forefront of any debate and other countries would never let Japan forget about it, yet I've never heard a word come out of Korea about this.

[lexico]

Was there a Japanese A-Bomb, genzai bakudan 原子爆彈, in 1945 ?


The Snell Report on an Interrogation of a Japanese Intelligence Officer
Japan Developed Atom Bomb; Russia Grabbed Scientists (http://www.reformation.org/atlanta-constitution.html) by David Snell
Atlanta Constitution Oct. 3 1946.
(C) The Atlanta Constitution and David Snell 1946


The controversy regarding the Japanese Nuclear Program began with a US Army officer David Snell (an agent of the Twenty-Fourth Criminal Investigation Detachment) who interviewed a certain Japanese Captain Tsetusuo Wakabayashi ( "pseudonym" ) who had been "in charge of counter-espionage at the atomic developing project in Korea.” “Wakabayashi” told Snell in Seoul 1945 that;

Japan had been trying to build its own nuclear bombs since at least as far back as 1938, upon hearing of German success in splitting the atom.

He recounted the appointment by the Imperial Japanese Army of Dr. Nishina Yoshio (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoshio_Nishina) 仁科芳雄 ---one of the world’s foremost nuclear physicists and a former student of Neils Bohr---to head the bomb assembly effort at the national science academy, Tokyo’s Riken Institute.

Research proceeded at a relatively leisurely pace until the tide of war turned against Japan, after which the Army and, later, the Navy began pouring more and more resources into building a working device and turning it into a practical weapon.

When American B-29s arrived to firebomb mainland cities, the program was disrupted and had to be largely evacuated and reconstituted in Korea, at Hungnam 興南 (Jap. Konan), where Japanese zaibatsu colonial entrepreneurs (such as Noguchi Shitagau 野口 遵, 1873-1944) had built a gigantic military industrial complex after taking control of the area in the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War.

It was here, Wakabayashi claimed, that the Japanese atomic bomb, the genzai bakudan 原子爆彈 (“greatest fighter” [sic. > "element bomb"]) was completed and test-fired on August 12, just after Nagasaki. He said it would have been finished three months earlier had it not been for the B-29s, which he considered to have been the decisive weapon in the war.

Alas for Japan, there was only enough uranium fuel to power the test detonation, and with the Soviets bearing down on Hungnam 興南 (Jap. Konan)---the largest industrial installation in all of Asia at that time---the decision was made to abandon the project and destroy as much of it as possible.

Much documentation accordingly vanished, along with several bomb casings for additional, not yet completed genzai bakudan 原子爆彈, but the Soviet advance was so fast and overwhelming that most of the complex fell into Russian hands intact, and a number of prominent Japanese atomic scientists were captured---and, later, ruthlessly tortured."The Japanese Bomb And Why It Matters (http://www.coldwar.org/text_files/may_june_04.pdf) (pdf)
William J. Pellas (http://www.williamjpellas.com/)
in Cold War Times May/June 2004 pp. 19-20
(C) US Library of Congress 2003


Obviously there would be thousands of pages to be written on the Japanese nuclear program, and at least dozens of questions raised. These are some that I believe are essential :

1) How much of Wakabayashi's account of Japan's nuclear program and bomb testing relayed in Snell's report can be supported by evidence ?

If the answer is preeminently positive, follows the question;

2) How much was the US aware of the Japanese nuclear program ? Is there evidence ?

If the answer is preeminently positive, follows the question;

3) Did that knowledge influence the US bombing of Hiroshima ? Is there evidence ?

If the answer is preeminently positive, follows the question;

4) How much can Japan be blamed for its hypocricy of crying murder when they themselves were contemplating nuclear bombing US mainland indiscriminately with 9,000 nuclear weapons dropped from balloons as it had done with conventional bombs ? Is there evidence ?

If the answer is preeminently positive, follows the question;

5) How much has Japan been preparing for a nuclear re-armament after 1952 ? Is there evidence ?

If the answer is preeminently positive, follows the questions;

6) Where does Japan's nuclear offensive preparedness stand right now ?
What evidence do we have of Japan walking the double ropes of "victim" and "villain" ?
What has been its main means of information manipulation ?

7) What interest lies in a "possible" nuclear re-armament of Japan for the US ?
It is obvious that a nuclear re-armament amounts to independence from the US nuclear shield, politically and militarily.
What's in it for the US to let Japan slip out of its rein ?
Or is it just another "conspiration cooked up by idle day-dreamers and Japan bashers" ?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Useful links On the (Japanese) Nuclear Program(s):

Japanese atomic program (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_atomic_program)
Nuclear Weapons Program (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nuke/) FAS: The Federation of American Scientists
Japan and Atomic Bombs (http://vikingphoenix.com/public/JapanIncorporated/1895-1945/japan_abombs.htm) Links to Japan Incorporated articles
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON (http://www.ask.ne.jp/~hankaku/english/chronotbl.html) Masaaki Koarashi
Japanese development of nuclear energy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_Nuclear_Energy_Development) several possible Japanese nuclear testings before August 15, 1945
Supposedly...studies advanced to making one or two little experimental atomic artefacts in Hungnam 興南 (Konan) Installations in Korea 朝鮮 (Chosen), using the heavy water facilities provided for Noguchi Zaibatsu, and test-fired just after the final of war this in the Eastern Sea (Sea of Japan). Other versions mentions why these experiments continuing in Manchukuo and the test-fire was carried out in East Gobi desert in Hsingan province with support of Unit 731. (words edited for diction)
Japan's Atomic Bomb: We almost lost all (http://www.grunt.com/scuttlebutt/corps-stories/ww2/atomicbomb.asp) a personal account by Leon Thompson
Japan's A-Bomb (http://39th.org/39th/hc/hc_japan_a_bomb.html) 39th Bomb Group (VH), 20th Air Force, claims Japan detonated an atomic bomb
Japan's Atomic Bomb (http://www.trossman.blogspot.com/) Michael Trossman favors Imperial Japan's motivation, suggests nuclear rearmament of modern Japan
Wiki Talk: Japanese atomic program (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Japanese_atomic_program) discussion on IJ nuclear program

German nuclear energy project (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_nuclear_energy_project)
Soviet atomic bomb project (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_atomic_bomb_project)
Manhattan Project (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manhattan_Project)
Links: japan nuclear weapons program (http://www.google.com/custom?q=japan+nuclear+weapons+program&sitesearch=fas.org&sa=Search&cof=LW%3A600%3BBIMG%3Ahttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.fas.org%2Fp aper2.jpg%3BL%3Ahttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.fas.org%2Ffas_ban ner.gif%3BLH%3A50%3BAH%3Acenter%3BGL%3A0%3BAWFID%3 A0d60397048482b28%3B&formAction=) Links to FAS articles, nuclear programs of the world
List of countries with nuclear weapons (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_nuclear_weapons)

History of nuclear weapons (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_nuclear_weapons)
Nuclear weapon (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon)
Nuclear weapon design (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_design)
Critical mass (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_mass)

Uranium Maps (http://www.wise-uranium.org/umaps.html) Worldwide distribution of Uranium Ores (requires Java)
Uraninite (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_ore)
Yellowcake (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yellowcake)
Uranium hexafluoride (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_hexafluoride)
Uranium (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium)
Uranium-235 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium-235)
Uranium-238 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium-238)
Plutonium (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plutonium)

Uranium Production (http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/uranium.htm) FAS page
Heavy water (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy_Water)
Enriched uranium (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enriched_uranium)
Uranium Enrichment (http://www.uic.com.au/nip33.htm)
Uranium Enrichment (http://www.urenco.com/im/uploaded/1086887106.pdf) (pdf)
Isotope separation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isotope_separation) for uranium enrichment

Gaseous diffusion (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaseous_diffusion)
Gas centrifuge (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas_centrifuge)
Zippe-type centrifuge (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zippe-type_centrifuge)

Cyclotron (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclotron) a kind of particle accelerator
Particle accelerator (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_accelerator)
Particle Accelerators Around the World (http://www-elsa.physik.uni-bonn.de/accelerator_list.html)

Nuclear testing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_testing)
Nuclear explosion (detonation, blast) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_explosion)
Nuclear Weapon Effects Calculator (http://www.stardestroyer.net/Empire/Science/Nuke.html)
Electromagnetic pulse (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_pulse)
Gamma radiation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamma_rays)
Firestorm (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire_storm)
Shock wave (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shock_wave)
Mushroom cloud (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mushroom_cloud)
Radioactive contamination (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radioactive_contamination)
Nuclear fallout (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fallout)

Trinity test (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinity_test)
Castle Bravo (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Castle_Bravo)
Tsar Bomba (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsar_Bomba)
Table of Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide: 1945-69 | 1970-96 (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab15.asp) National Resources Defense Council
Category: Nuclear test sites (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Nuclear_test_sites)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vorpar:

What are required for Wakabayashi-Snell-Wilcox's claim to Japan's Nuclear Bomb Testing of August 12, 1945 ?

These are the bare minimum number of conditions that would have to be met
1) for a Japanese atomic bomb to have existed at that time
2) for the nuclear bomb to have detonated off shore of Hungnam 興南 (Jap. Konan) Korea, August 12, 1945.

First there would have had to be uranium ore(s) to supply the raw, naturally occurring uranium within Japanese access.

Second there would have had to be a facility with a certain throughput, processing the raw uranium to a higher concentration of uranium.

Third there would have had to be an established enrichment technology.

Fourth there would have had to be a facility employing the enrichment technolgy to separate U-235 from U-238 via enrichment.

Fifth the enrichment process would have had to last long enough to have accumulated U-235 above critical mass.

Six there would have had to be an explosion mechanism deveoped. The enriched U-235 of a quantity above critical mass would have had to be assembled in sub-critical mass parts that would reach above critical mass at time of desired detonation.

Seventh if the bomb was tested, there would have had to be telltale signs of the testing if the test was performed above ground or waters.

Does the August 12, 1945 Japanese a-bomb have enough evidence (records, witness accounts, orders, plans, reports, books) to satisfy these criteria ?

What does Robert K. Wilcox have to offer in terms of concrete evidence supporting the existence of a working atomic bomb in Imperial Japan before the surrender ?

[lexico]

Vorpar:

"She said that if Truman had waited even one week longer, there may never have been a need to drop the bombs." This is demonstrably untrue. 3 days before that week was up, the Japanese had successfully tested their own atomic bomb.I believe you mean August 12, 1945. From what I read, the atomic bomb testing might not have been successful. What makes you (or your sources) conclude that the a-bomb testing was a success ? Besides, even if the testing was a success, those happened AFTER the dropping of fat-man and little-boy. So in principle, the testing which occurred later could not have influenced the US decision to "nuke 'em" both of which which occurred earlier than the alleged Japanese testing.It was planned to be used on the nearly 1 million [sic. > 3.5 million] person strong invasion of Kyushu... In hindsight, the bombings turned out to stop the war immediately, but I don't know that I can justify them with the knowledge that they had at the time. Could you be more specific on that piece of info ?
When was the decision made ?
Who (or what document) relates that decision ?
Who knew in Imperial Japan of that decision ?
Who in the US knew this beforehand ?
Unless the US knew this IJ decision, it would also become impossible to say that the "Kyushu Plan" had anything to do with the US decision to nuke Hiroshima & Nagasaki.Wilcox, Rober K. Japan's Secret War. New York: Marlowe & Co., 1995He is definitely the spearhead of the theory now. Are you aware of any new evidence he was able to muster in his new 1995 edition after the 1985 edition ?Pictorial History of the Second World War, vol. 5. New York: Wm. H. Wise & Co., 1970

Parrott, Lindsay. "Five Cyclotrons Wrecked in Japan." New York Times, Novermber 24, 1945.
(additional stories on Nov 26, 29 and Dec 5, 6, 14, and 15.)
The book I'm reading has a photo of one of the cyclotrons being disposed of by the US military. Jack Seward's Strange But True Stories from Japan.The existence of cyclotrons doesn't mean a thing in itself; in fact there are Particle Accelerators and Accelerator Laboratories around the World (http://www-elsa.physik.uni-bonn.de/accelerator_list.html) on Electron accelerator ELSA (http://www-elsa.physik.uni-bonn.de/index_en.html) page
This is not a complete list in that it only counts major particle accelerator lab sites; often one lab will have more than one accelerator, but is counted as one.

Argentina 1
Belgium 1
Brazil 1
Canada 2
China 1
Denmark 1
Finland 1
France 5
Germany 21
India 3
Italy 8
Japan 6
Jordan 1
South Korea 1
Netherlands 1
Russian Federation 6
South Africa 1
Switzerland 8
Sweden 4
Taiwan 1
UK 3
USA 3422 countries listed here for illustration that have the more advanced version of the cyclotron, and hence those that could be considered comparable to Japan having 5 cyclotrons back in 1945. Now they don't all have nuclear bombs, do they ?
Also must be noted, countries with nuclear weapons such as Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel are not even listed. Therefore using the cyclotron as evidence to support the existence of atomic bombs in 1945 Japan before the surrender is unfounded.

60-inch cyclotron, completed 1938 Riken Institute (http://www.riken.jp/engn/r-world/riken/history/zaidan-b/index.html) (理研) 理化学研究所 (http://www.riken.jp/r-world/riken/history/zaidan-b/index.html)
The first to be built in Japan, this was a copy of Lawrence Livermore National Lab's; developping the cyclotron at Cal Berkeley in the 1930's, the American inventor Dr Ernst Lawrence had personally delivered the plans for this device to Dr Nishina Yoshio himself. Of course this was before the Pacific War broke out in Dec. 1941.

http://www.riken.jp/engn/r-world/riken/history/zaidan-b/image/cyclo.jpg http://www.riken.jp/engn/r-world/riken/history/zaidan-b/image/cyclo02.jpg

[lexico]

Korea, China et. al. need no excuses to criticize Japan's wartime atrocities. If there had been any testing of nuclear weapons on Korean soil, I'm pretty sure it would be at the forefront of any debate and other countries would never let Japan forget about it, yet I've never heard a word come out of Korea about this.There are claims being made in Korean sources, so the possiblity does deserve some attention. While some of the arguments and evidence rely on either the original Snell report or the studies done by Robert Wilcox, there are certain independent studies with evidence from Hungnam workers who now reside in South Korea.

Also Newsweek once did a special report on the North Korean nuclear program, and I remember reading about the scientists/students/workers at Hungnam during the Japanese Occupation of Korea. Many personnel from before August 15, 1945 are supposed to have participated in the current N.Korean nuclear weapons program. Not to mention the alleged Japanese involvement in non-peaceful use of nuclear energy behind doors since 1954 to the present, the subject deserves an even closer study. This might be connected to the "conspiracy" that is shrouded behind all the cries of Japan being a "victimised nation." I've left the opinion unstated thus far in hopes of seeing if there are those who go beyond the obvious when looking at this issue and seeing what ideas others might have regarding what self-serving interest Japan might have in continuing to focus on the two atomic bombings practically to the exclusion of any other aspect of World War Two and in what way this course may have affected international relations between Japan and her neighboring countries over the last sixty years.

[lexico]

And where exactly was this bomb tested ? You need an extremely large amount of space to test a bomb. Testing one in Japan would be nearly impossible due to the densely populated environment. The Japanese were being pinned back on every front, so it's unlikely they could have taken it overseas for testing. I'm curious as to where exactly this device went off and why there is no mention of it in any official records.Three pieces of information say;

1) On board an unmanned naval ship off the seaport city of Hungnam 興南 (Konan), the test bomb detonated, creating a "mushroom cloud," a "flash of light," and an "audible tone of explosion" visible/audible from 32 km away.
One source says this is recorded in a military intelligence report dated August 12, 1945. See map for Hungnam, on the east coast facing Eastern Sea in present day North Korea.

http://tplantevin.free.fr/IMAGES/Cartes/Asie/Coree_carte.gif

2) Another account point to Nagoya for a planned atomic testing which never happened.

3) Yet another account tells of a test-fire was in East Gobi desert, Hsingan province, China, with Unit 731 support.

Japanese development of nuclear energy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_development_of_nuclear_energy) several possible Japanese nuclear testings before August 15, 1945

Supposedly...studies advanced to making one or two little experimental atomic artefacts in Hungnam 興南 (Konan) Installations in Korea 朝鮮 (Chosen)... these experiments continuing in Manchukuo and the test-fire was carried out in East Gobi desert in Hsingan province with support of Unit 731. (words edited for diction)

The original argument for creating the bomb was because Germany was considered to be close to developing one, so the Allies knew they had to develop the technology first. If there was any real knowledge that the Japanese had a bomb, this would have been a propaganda gift for Truman in his argument for ending the war quickly.What you say could be the case, however N.Korea, including Hungnam, was captured by the USSR, together with the plans, scientists, technicians, facilities, and materials if they existed. Either Truman was not aware of Hungnam's importance, underestimated the Soviets, or was too embarassed to make public the Japanese atomic program in Hungnam, Korea, code name "*NZ PROJECT." Yet, no one at the time, or since in an official capacity has ever used this argument that I'm aware of.True, but the revised 1995 Robert Wilcox book seems to present some gov'tal/intelligence documents that support the Hungnam atomic bomb testing.

*NZ PROJECT is the term favored by Korean sources that also claim the code name was an exact copy of the German nuclear project. Acc. to William Pellas, however, there were two Japanese nuclear programs;

1. Project Ni IJ Army's effort, Headed by Nishina at Riken. This program was halted by the April 1945 B-29 firebombing raids of Tokyo.

2. Project F-Go What was left of Project Ni was folded into IJ Navy's program, authorised in 1943. Acc. to "Wakabayashi" it was the F-Go that acutally completed and test fired a single warhead utilising the facilities at Hungnam, Korea.

http://www.arirang21.com/news/photo/1229-2-2416.jpg

Hungnam 興南 (Konan) where the alleged Japanese atomic bomb was developed and tested. One can see facilities of Choson Nitrogen Fertiliser Factory Co., a daughter company of Nippon Nitrogen Fertilzer Co., Tokyo.

http://www.tparents.org/library/unification/books/sm-early/Hungnam-Bomb.gif

Hungnam, following US air raids in the Korean War 1950-1953

edit: The third testing info regarding a test-fire of an atomic bomb in the Gobi desert appeared after original posting, and was added subsequently.

[Silverpoint]

I just want to clarify at this point so that I know we're all on the same page. When I talk about "testing" to me this means actually detonating a bomb, not just trying to build one. I realise that this word could be interpreted in a number of ways, so I want to make sure we're all agreeing terms.

[lexico]

Good point, Silverpoint. There have been quite misleading reports such as the one done by BBC in 2004 that S.Korea had conducted a "nuclear test."

S Korea chided for nuclear tests (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4004865.stm)
11 November, 2004
BBC Newsthe government has argued that the tests were on too small a scale to be significant and only 0.7g of plutonium and 200mg of uranium were produced...
The report said that South Korean scientists had enriched a small amount of uranium to 77% uranium-235, which is close to weapons-grade.

However, it said the average enrichment during the uranium experiments was about 10.2%.

The report stated that the IAEA had found no indications that the experiments had gone beyond small-scale laboratory activities. While the "nuclear test" being referred to at the time involved only 0.7 grams of plutonium and 0.2 grams of a uranium isotope to study the chemical properties, the headline gave the impression of a "nuclear warhead detonating test" causing international uproars.

In the case of the alleged Hungnam "nuclear testing" it seems pretty clear from context that it is referring to a "nuclear warhead detonating test," not the chemical properties test in a chemistry-physics lab of micorscopic scale. But it's good that you raised the point to prevent any possible confusion, thanks. It is especially so because of the obvious historical implication a nuclear program conducted by Imperial Japan will have on the August 6 dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Now whether, and how much, the US gov't/military knew beforehand will in itself constitute a totally separate matter; still I agree with you that it is mandatory to excercise the greatest caution, whichever matter we are discussing.

[lexico]

Recently a "historian" in the UK published a book claiming that Germany had also developed a bomb, but his arguments were widely discredited. He put up what seemed like a reasonably sound argument to someone reading his book. But when you looked at the bigger picture, he had been incredibly selective with the truth in order to build a case.There was also a German economic historian Rainer Karlsch who published Hitler's Bomb. He claimed that German scientists "set off a test explosion two months before the end of World War II, killing hundreds of people in eastern Germany." He also claimed that "the March 1945 device didn't achieve fission, but did scatter telltale radioactive particles at the Ohrdruf test site. It also claims that Nazi Germany briefly had a working nuclear reactor."

Book: Nazis Tested Crude Nuclear Device (http://www.fpp.co.uk/Hitler/docs/atombomb/Ruegen_more.html)
Tony Czuczkam, March 14, 2005
Associated Press
Jeremy Bernstein, who edited the Farm Hall transcripts for the book "Hitler's Uranium Club: The Secret Recordings at Farm Hall," said a key question was where the enriched uranium could have come from.

"To enrich uranium, you need an plant the size of Oak Ridge, and the Germans never had one," he said, referring to the sprawling U.S. facility that produced enriched uranium for the Hiroshima bomb.

[lexico]

The alleged nuclear testing off shore of Hungnam (Konan) is detailed in this essay. Since the Snell report came out in 1946, and Wilcox's Secret War is the 1st 1985 edition, the so-called 1947 USO Intelligence report must have been cited in Wilcox's 1985 book. Without primary evidence, however, Tittle's account might simply turn out to be positive statements of Wilcox's speculations.

Military History: Invasion Japan (http://www.combatsim.com/review.php?id=721)
Jim Tittle
2005-08-09 INVASION JAPAN -PART 4: The definitive defensive weapon and some conclusions.

NIPPONESE NUKES

Ok so lots of people have heard that the Germans were working on nuclear physics with the ultimate aim of creating an atomic bomb, right ? The 1.8 billion dollar Manhattan Project to produce the A-bombs that effectively ended the war is well known. What about Japanese endeavors in nuclear bombs ? You thought there were none? Think again.

The chief persona of the Japanese atomic program was Dr. Yoshio Nishina who was an intimate associate of Albert Einstein. Dr. Nishina foundeded his own Nishina Laboratory of the Institute for Physical and Chemical Research in 1931 to study high-energy physics. He built the first cyclotron in Japan in 1936. It was a 26-incher. A 60-inch, 220 ton cyclotron was built in 1937. In 1938 Japan also purchased a cyclotron from the University of California, Berkeley. Cyclotrons were used to separate fissionable material from uranium.

Nishida understood the military potential of nuclear weapons, and figured that the Americans were working on a genzai bakudan (atomic bomb). Unlike his counterpart, Heisenberg in Germany, he wholeheartedly sought to solve the atomic riddle and produce a weapon. In 1939, President Roosevelt funded the first nuclear studies into fissionable weapons in the United States. This prompted the patriotic Dr. Nishina to match the U.S. research and develop a nuclear weapon. Lt. General Takeo Yasuda of the Japanese Army decided in October 1940, that such a weapons program was worthy of study and the Japanese atomic program commenced in July 1941 under the guidance of Dr. Nishina.

The well-know rivalry between the Japanese Army and Navy diluted strength of production projects as each insisted their own weapon was of paramount importance even if it was nearly identical to the other’s. They perpetually wasted manpower and resources duplicating efforts. So it was in atomic research.

A completely separate atomic program run by the Japanese Navy was in simultaneous study in 1942. The project was called “F-Go” and was headed by Professor Bunsaku Arakatsu, who studied under Albert Einstein. Arakatsu built his own cyclotron too.

The Navy’s plan wisely was to harness nuclear energy as an power source in order to reduce the dependence on petroleum. As the war unfolded not favoring Japan the idea of making a nuclear weapon became more promising. Initially it was assumed that an atomic weapon could not be developed during the limited span of time of the war.

A search for uranium throughout the empire commenced. The Japanese military took what Nishina had learned so far and expanded the program. The Navy payed large amounts for uranium on the Chinese black market. And we know about U-234’s unsuccessful attempt to transport uranium oxide to Japan from Germany. How far the Navy project progressed is a matter of conjecture but a member of the team was Hideki Yukawa, the first Japanese physicist to receive a Nobel Prize in 1949.

So where did the uranium ore come from? The atomic programs found a source of uranium ore in Korea. Dr. Nishina experimented with a number of methods for enriching the uranium and decided that the gaseous diffusion method was the most rewarding. Colonel Tatsusaburo Suzuki coordinated the effort for the Army and built five advanced gaseous diffusion separators based on the smaller one developed by Nishina. The fate of these separators is a mystery.

In 1938 Germany and Japan met to discuss the feasibility of the production of atomic weapons and atomic energy. Theories were explored but techinal data was not exchanged at that time. Japan later requested assistance from ally Germany but it is not known how much material Japan received. This is lost to history. All we know of for sure is the one shipment of uranium oxide that was intercepted on U-234 just after VE Day.

The program was moved from Nagoya to Konan, Korea (North Korea now) in 1943 due to increasing bombing attacks. Some 40,000 worked at the facility 25,000 of whom were engineers and scientists. The facility was partly underground. About 400 worked in the underground cave area on the most sensitive aspects of the bomb. A project director coordinated with six other reknown scientists each contributing but one phase and unaware of the others.

By August 10, 1945 the Hiroshima blast had taken place so the men assembling the bomb worked quickly. If an Allied invasion was imminent Japan would need the A-bomb to make toast of the forthcoming American invasion armada. Stalin declared war on Japan on August 8th and with enough reinforcements free from European combat Russians crossed the Manchurian border.

After midnight the device was trucked to the Konan harbor. It was loaded aboard a small vessel and final preparations were undertaken for the test. Presumably an anchorage in an inlet some twenty miles away was to be the unsuspecting and unwilling live target area. It was filled with mostly wooden fishing boats and ships with sails.

The boat with the device was robot controlled and it puttered towards the anchorage before dawn on August 12th. The vessel beached itself just as the sun’s first rays of the day hit the water. The genzai bakudan triggered and the observers wearing welding goggles gasped at the immediate intense burst of light rivaling the sun.

The fire flash was about 1,000 yards in diameter and from it a mushroom cloud boiled up to the stratosphere. The vaporized water obscured the anchored vessels but most of them were burning. When the epicenter cleared some ships previously seen were completely gone without trace. The area of destruction was approximately one square mile.

But it was all too late. The Russians were hours away and the equipment at the Konan facility was smashed and the underground entrances blown up. The scientists were unable to escape and at least the top men were spirited away to Moscow for torture. The Soviets closed up the area quickly and tightly. American War Reparations personnel later were kept under constant supervision and restricted from many areas. Even a B-29 with humanitarian supplies was shot down by the itchy Russians.

On Aug. 29, 1945, an American B-29 piloted by a Lt. Jose H. Queen of Ashland, KY headed for Konan with a cargo of food and medical supplies. They were to be dropped over an Allied prisoner of war camp there. Four Yak fighters from nearby Hammung Airfield circled the B-29 and signaled the pilot to land on the too-small airstrip.

Queen did not obey and swung the big plane around to return to Saipan. Ten miles off the coast the Yaks opened up and the B-29 went down. All twelve disembarked safely but one Yak strafed and missed the radio operator. The Russians said they saw the American markings but since the Germans had used captured American planes they thought the Japanese might also. Remember this was two weeks after the official end of hostilities.

While the consensus of the Americans was that the Japanese could have been nowhere near producing an atomic bomb, that even the Germans were farther advanced, it is curious what this conclusion is based upon since no American has ever inspected the Konan facilities ! It was a dangerous game to underestimate your enemy as the Allies found in December 1944 when the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge) shocked the Americans to the realization that they could still lose the war. When the kamikazes became a horrifying reality in a divine wind over Okinawa there was no defense for them. There were no intelligence reports on either event to suggest the Allies were not taken completely by surprise.

Yoshio Nishina died in 1951. Since World War II the Konan area has been either in Soviet or North Korean hands so no look-see has ever been possible. It has been determined that heavy water was shipped out of the area in the 1950s to Russia.

At any rate, the Japanese could very well have had the capability of cobbling together a dirty bomb that did not create a chain reaction explosion but would rather dispense radioactive material into the vicinity of the target point, as the Germans could have done. Let us guess if they would have used it over Kyushu.

Snell, David
Japan Developed Atom Bomb; Russia Grabbed Scientists
Atlanta Constitution Oct 2, 1946

Wilcox, Robert K.
Japan's Secret War: Japan's Race Against Time to Build Its Own Atomic Bomb Morrow Publishing, NY 1985 Copyright ©1996 - 2005 COMBATSIM.COM, Inc.

[lexico]

The following has more quotes in greater detail although none are conclusive evidence of a Japanese atomic testing. Scroll down to 12/1/2004, 9:04 pm EST, bluescreenofdeath's very long post.

Iran: Saudi Arabia has nuclear weapons, Archives - December 2004, www.godlikeproductions.com (http://www.godlikeproductions.com/bbs/aitem.php?message=46924&show=1204&PHPSESSID=14d22b3df6080a2d25c0bc7f52f4e0db)

[Mars Man]

A whole lot of good spade work has been done. This is information for me to learn from, without doubt. I will study it as I have the time. Thank you guys for all this nice detail. :cool:

As for the actual bombings, and my feelings, I have no firm and fixed thoughts or conclusions. I just feel, that it happened in the 'heat of the battle', so to speak. I would strongly prefer that it had not happened. No war is for the better, no killing is either, but the social animal has it in the natural makings, it seems, to fight and, sadly, kill (not by honest error).

I sometimes wonder what 'turning the other cheek' would do for natural selection? :?

[lexico]

Does anyone have additional information regarding a "nuclear research" in Manchuria in the later yrs of the Sino-Japanese War/WWII/Pacific War conducted by a Unit or Special facility such as one dircected by Unit 731 ?
With a general amnesty extended to former personnel at Unit 731 and the like in exchange for collaboration, there must be enough survivors to live and tell the details of the 'nuclear testing' if it happened. Why is there so little information ? What do we know about the Japanese nuclear experiments in the Gobi desert ? Were they all required to commit suicide to secure secrecy or are they keeping silence at the request of the US gov't ?

Kempeitai 憲兵隊 Political Department and Epidemic Prevention Research Laboratory 防疫硏究所 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kempeitai_Political_Department_and_Epidemic_Preven tion_Research_Laboratory)
Kempeitai Political Department 憲兵隊 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kempeitai)
Unit 731: Epidemic Prevention Research Laboratory 防疫硏究所 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_731)

The Political department and Epidemic Prevention Research Laboratory, now usually associated with the name Unit 731, was initially set up as a political and ideological section of the Kempeitai military police of pre-Pacific War Japan. It was meant to counter the ideological or political influence of enemies, and to reinforce the ideology of military units.

It worked through political propaganda and as ideological representative of the Imperial Japanese Army's Kodoha 皇道派 (Imperial way faction, or war party). In the first phase this section drove against communist propaganda, but extended its responsibilities in other directions, at home and overseas.

It acted in Manchukuo and other areas on the Asian mainland. It was a rough equivalent to the NKVD political sections and or politruk (political commissar) units of the Soviets; or the German Nazi SS propoganda departments. They promoted racial superiority, racialist theories, counterespionage, intelligence, political sabotage and infiltration of enemy lines. They liased with the Manchukuo military police, the Manchu intelligence service, regular Manchu police, Manchu Residents committees, Local Nationalist Manchu Parties and the Japanese Secret Service detachment in Manchukuo. The section in Manchukuo used some agents from White Russian, Chinese, Manchu, Mongol and other foreign backgrounds for special services or covert actions at home and abroad.Epidemic Prevention Research Laboratory (Unit 731)

The founder of Unit 731 was General Ishii Shiro. Ishii was placed in command of the Army Epidemic Prevention Research Laboratory located in Tokyo Headquarters in 1932. This laboratory concentrated on chemical warfare and biological warfare. He later organized the satellite laboratory in Harbin and set up the Manchu railway lines for transport of materials and equipment. Ishii organized the secret research group "Togo Unit", for the conduct of chemical and biological investigations in Bei-inho village (100 km south of Harbin). This site is the Zhongma Fortress.

This unit later was integrated into the Kwantung Army as Epidemic Prevention Department, but divided at the same time as the "Ishii Unit" and "Wakamatsu Unit" with a base in Hsinking. From 1941 on all these units were known collectively as "Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army", or "Unit 731" for short. They had support from the Imperial Youth Corps, Japanese university research, and the Kempeitai. Some sources link them with the Mitsui zaibatsu monopoly on poppy farming in Manchukuo (for production of heroin).

Other facilities under the direction of 731 Unit were:
Special Operations Units

Units with special and Unknown assignments in Manchuria and the Asian mainland. It has been suggested that nuclear research was conducted in Manchuria towards the end of the war by this branch
End of the war

Operations and experiments continued until the end of the war. With the Russian invasion of Manchukuo and Mengjiang in August 1945, these units mentioned above had to abandon their work in haste. All members of these units and their families fled across Manchuria and China to return to Japan. Behind them they left skeleton crews to hide evidence of atrocities. All facilities were to be demolished with explosives, but most were so well constructed that they survived somewhat intact as testimony to what happened there.

Ishii commanded that every member of the group take the secret of their experiments to the grave with them, threatening to find them if they failed, and ordering none of them to go into public work back in Japan. All infected rats, bacteria cultures, and human prisoners were killed and the evidence quickly destroyed. Potassium cyanide vials were issued in event the remaining personnel were captured.

[Ewok85]

I'm with Mike on this - yes, it was a horrible thing to do, but was it right? Compared to the alternative - a large scale land invasion - yes, it was right. If I was able to go back in time and decide whether or not it should happen, I would say yes.

Theres alot people don't know or understand certain factors about this. Hiroshima was chosen as it was a large military city (home to the second general headquarters), non-essential personel had largely been evacuated month earlier.

First Japan was given a chance to a "unconditional surrender" which was later changed to be a "the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces". Failing this the next step was taken.

The alternative would have been far far more horrible. It would have begun with Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu. Starting with heavy naval and aerial attacks followed by land forces moving in and holding territory. From memory the resources on hand by the Allies were about 50 carriers, 800 assorted war ships and 1500 transports. Troops who were already in the Pacific would spearhead the invasion with the troops from the European campaign being transported over to provide reinforcements for the next stage. Would have been around about 3 Corps of ground troops, 100,000's of men.

The enemy they faced was a mixed bag. Around about 200,000 Japanese soldiers were in Kyushu when the surrender was announced, while poorly armed they were willing to fight to the death. Around 5000 planes were at their disposal, which were planned to be used as kamikaze weapons focused on troop ships to severly damage and demoralise their invaders. There were a number of other "special weapons" thought up like mini-subs, small suicide boats and people were trained to strap bombs to their bodies and to throw themselves under tanks. Cilvilians and children were trained to use spears or other basic weapons. The conservative figure given for casualties for the operation is slated to be 125,000 for the Allies, 25% being KIA, the rest wounded, MIA and captured soldiers, and losses for the Japanese estimated to be 5 times this.

Once Kyushu had been taken the focus would have been on Tokyo, Operation Coronet. 2 weeks of endless barrages from Naval vessels and air raids to soften defences and lower moral. This would be followed by 2 invasions on Tokyo, a D-day sized landing would take the eastern side of Tokyo bay and at the same time another group would take Yokosuka port and reinforce with armour. Airstrikes could continue from over 100 carriers offshore and newly captured airbases on Kyushu. Casualties on the Japanese side would have been easily multiple millions of people.

It was expected that the Japanese would surrender after taking Kyushu, but we'll never know will we?

[WilliamJPellas]

I was quite pleased when I saw Jeremy Bernstein quoted on this thread. He has written one of the truly excellent books on the history and (likely) progress of German nuclear weapons development in WWII, Hitler's Uranium Club. Bernstein, himself a student of advanced physics, is in general well-equipped to speak on this subject, and his book is particularly notable because it answers one of the most important questions about the German effort. Namely, did Hitler's scientists in fact possess sufficient theoretical knowledge of atomic physics to enable them to develop a working, supercritical detonation, atomic fission warhead?

The answer to that question is---shockingly---a definitive "NO". At least, the answer is no if the Farm Hall recordings are any indication. These recordings were made by British Intelligence, which captured most of the top German nuclear scientists and interred them at a country estate (Farm Hall) immediately after Germany surrendered. The entire place, inside and out, was bugged, and the British were able to listen in on thousands of hours of conversations between top German minds like Werner Heisenberg and, if memory serves, Carl von Weiszacker. These two were by most assessments the main figures in the German effort. I say "effort" rather than "program" because the Nazi bomb---like the rest of the German industrial war effort and like the Nazi Party itself---was subject to the machinations of numerous petty bureaucracies and fiefdoms and all their associated political maneuverings. Thus there were several "centers of gravity" in the scientific effort as well as in the apparently abortive actions taken toward translating theory into industrial reality. For example, I know of at least two (2) major attempts at reactor construction, and it would not surprise me if there were at least several more. The end result was, of course, that much of the German atomic effort was diffused and disjointed; in any case it was never formally, forcefully organized along the American model and was not even as coherent as the two competing Japanese programs, Ni (Japanese Army) and F-Go (Imperial Japanese Navy).

In any case, the Farm Hall recordings show, apparently conclusively, that Heisenberg---without question the top German atomic scientist of WWII---did not understand the "fast neutron reaction" that is necessary for supercritical detonation. Instead, he was comparitively well-versed in the "slow neutron reaction", as found in atomic power plants and "breeder" reactors. This is no doubt the main reason for Germany's fixation with heavy water during the War; Heisenberg and most other German scientists had in mind to construct a breeder reactor moderated by that substance. This was certainly a sound concept, but it was in fact the longest, hardest way around the problem given the technology of the day. While heavy water is certainly a perfectly good moderator, technically it requires a much more complex design than does a reactor that has other material serving as a moderator---such as graphite, which the Americans used in their Y-12 reactor at Oak Ridge, TN.

Heisenberg's idea to construct a heavy water reactor was also undoubtedly influenced by another factor, namely, the work of von Weiszacker, who actually predicted with a high degree of accuracy the nature and properties of the new, artificial element that would be produced by a breeder reactor: plutonium. The Germans would certainly have had far more plutonium than highly enriched uranium on hand had they been successful; perhaps Heisenberg figured that as long as no one was really sure exactly how to make fissionable material detonate, he would have a better chance at success if he simply had larger amounts with which to work. A breeder reactor---such as the Americans constructed at Hanford, Washington---would certainly have provided more material much faster than uranium separators would have. Thus, in the end, it may have been German uncertainty over exactly how to make a fission bomb detonate that led to them choosing the much more difficult water-moderated plutonium reactor route. Much of this is discussed in masterly detail in Thomas Powers' excellent book, Heisenberg's War.

What Powers misses is the aforementioned fact of Heisenberg's lack of knowledge of the fast neutron reaction. Powers wrote his book a scant few years before the release of the top secret, classified Farm Hall recordings. Among other things, on the recordings Heisenberg is heard musing about the American success in producing a fission bomb, and gradually coming to comprehend his own mistakes in his mathematical / physical calculations. Assuming Heisenberg did not successfully hide prior knowledge of the fast neutron reaction---highly unlikely given that virtually every word he and the other scientists said over several months was recorded, and von Weiszacker's papers had already been captured by the OSS at his laboratory in Paris---then it must be concluded that a true German fission bomb was probably impossible during the War.

However, the purported test detonation in East Germany still deserves careful research and scrutiny for several reasons---and here I must state that I am quite disappointed with Bernstein, who in my view on this one issue takes the easy way out and is lazy in his thinking. That he does so is all the more surprising and disappointing given the undeniable excellence of his book. First, even if a true fission bomb was beyond German science in WWII, a dirty bomb was not. We know for a fact that a dirty bomb attack on New York was a cherished dream of a number of Nazi war architects. Plans existed to mount the dirty bomb as a warhead on the next generation of V-2 missiles, which would have had true intercontinental range. (It bears mentioning that the V-2 itself was the highest flying manmade object until the Russians lauched Sputnik in 1957.) I have seen one of the targeting documents myself; it showed concentric circles directly over Manhattan, along with the radius of the projected kill zone. Second, even if the Germans did not understand exactly how to produce a fission detonation, they still knew it required a critical mass and that that could be produced by rapidly ramming together U-235 in a tube. (ie, the "gun-type" atomic bomb, like the American Little Boy and, if it existed, the Japanese genzai bakudan. The gun-type weapon is the easiest type of atomic fission weapon to engineer and to construct.) Just through clumsy trial and error under utterly desperate, end of war conditions, they might have produced a "fizzle"---a very low grade, partially successful detonation, not unlike the Chernobyl disaster. Not much of a bang, relatively speaking, but plenty of hard, "dirty" radiation. On the other hand, they may have been knowingly testing a dirty bomb in keeping with their targeting and missile work. Either way, a German radiological weapon would have been devastating. Not nearly as purely destructive as a fission bomb, but still capable of killing thousands of people in a densely packed urban area such as New York City. It would certainly not have required anything remotely like the industrial capacity of the massive Manhattan Project in order to produce a dirty bomb. The assertion by many scholars that this must be so is a shameful knee-jerk reaction and is in my view lazy thinking. Certainly, we must be careful to avoid groundless speculation in all this. But lesser industrial capacity in and of itself is no guarantee that other nations besides America could not possibly have succeeded in their nuclear quests in World War II. Third, what the Germans did have in WWII was a device that could be applied directly to the process of weapons-grade uranium enrichment/production: the Clusius Tube. One of the really strange things about the whole German bomb effort was the fact that they failed despite having practical (albeit torturously slow) HEU production technology before the war even started! The British MAUD Committee, in fact, actually produced industrial bomb production calculations based on the Clusius Tube, in 1939 (again, per Powers' book). It is a great mystery why the Germans ignored this ready-made solution in favor of the water-moderated plutonium reactor route. Unless, again, their thinking was that they really wanted to go for the gusto and were trying for true mass nuclear production right from the start---as the Americans achieved with their own plutonium bombs by 1945. There is one author, Carter Hydrick, who claims in his book Critical Mass that the Germans in fact did not completely abandon the Clusius Tube technology, and that they still produced a small amount of at least partially-enriched uranium-235. Here I must add that Hydrick's book has been roundly criticized by some pretty reputable people, including John Coster-Mullen (see his review on amazon.com) and Robert Norris. Robert Wilcox has read Hydrick (I have not yet done so) and says that while he is sympathetic to Hydrick's thesis, the book is lacking in documentation. If Germany in fact did manage to make any U-235, it undoubtedly ended up aboard one or more of the German and Japanese submarines that attempted the journey from Germany to Japan during the War. This is a matter of intense and rancorous debate; the standard history is that it was uranium oxide, not U-235, that was in the cargo hold of the last U-Boat that left Germany headed for the Pacific. (This boat was the U-234.) At least one member of the crew of that sub has testified in print that he saw "U-235" written on the uranium canisters, and also that they were lined with gold to prevent a chain reaction. Norris and Coster-Mullen scoff at this because they have examined the production records of the American HEU factories at Oak Ridge (where any German uranium would have been taken after the U-234 was captured in May 1945) and they see no evidence of a spike in production, such as would have resulted from a sudden infusion of German uranium, whether partially enriched or not. However, a certain Major Lansdale, "a notorious old spook" to quote Wilcox, testified in the 2003 History Channel production "Hitler's Last U-Boat" that the German uranium was incorporated into the American production and then into the Little Boy bomb that annihilated Hiroshima.

In any case, we ought not to be too quick to definitively say how far either Japan or Germany got, because there is a lot of documentation that was either destroyed or else remains hidden or classified to this day. What I have posted is a reasonable summary of what has been released to this point into the public domain. But I was completely unaware of the purported German bomb test, I had never before heard about the possible nuclear angle of Unit 731, and I had never before today seen actual photos of the Hungnam zaibatsu installation. Some people on this thread have done some excellent detective work! I look forward to learning much more on this topic, and welcome anyone who honestly wishes to share information and research.

[WilliamJPellas]

There have been several excellent studies done regarding the likely outcome of the planned American and Allied amphibious assault against the southernmost Japanese home island of Kyushu. This was Operation OLYMPIC, the first phase of the two-pronged final assault, Operation DOWNFALL (CORONET was the second phase). I recommend Edward Drea's article "Previews of Hell", Allen and Polmar's definitive book, Code Name Downfall, George Feifer's excellent Tennozan: the Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb, and my own book, Endgame: America, Japan, the Bomb, and the Close of the Pacific War.

Japanese troop strength on Kyushu had actually grown to almost 600,000 by July 1945. While it is true that Japan as a whole was starving and sick and that most Japanese industry had long been smashed by B-29s, what resources remained were going almost entirely into the planned suicide defense against OLYMPIC. This was Ketsu-Go, or Operation Decision. Without question, had the Allies and Japan come to blows as originally planned in these two operations, the result would have been the most horrific slaughter of the entire war, even worse than the Eastern Front conflict between Germany and the USSR. Because my time is limited tonight, rather than do additional original writing, I will quote from Endgame, copyright 2001-2002, US Library of Congress, all rights reserved:

The Army and Marine combat troops making the initial landing numbered 340,600. Service and support troops which were to land following the initial waves numbered an additional 218,360, and there would also be 15,770 Navy personnel going ashore to provide support for the Kyushu armada. Navy and Army Air Force personnel pushed the total number involved to 766,700. But even this number does not give a comprehensive picture of just how great an effort OLYMPIC really was. In the Pacific, supply lines were orders of magnitude longer than those in Europe. One author says that for every American soldier in the field in the Pacific theater, there were 19 additional personnel required to put him there and maintain his presence there. If this is an accurate figure, the monstrous logistical nightmare facing the DOWNFALL planners becomes readily apparent. “It is worth noting”, George Feifer tells us, “that ‘serving’ in 1945 was in most cases quite different from actually fighting. In many historical periods, authentic combat, the real thing, had been a relatively small part of military life, involving far fewer soldiers for far fewer days than the planning of it….only the men on (the) outer edges fell to bludgeons, swords, scimitars, and arrows. Technological development further reduced the proportion on the front lines, more sophisticated weapons requiring more personnel to service them. The greater the distance from the fighters’ homes at which the battle was fought, the greater the numbers needed for transport, supply, and bookkeeping….Thus….each man at the front was supported by nineteen others, usually from a considerable distance.” Given this ratio, the strength of the American war economy was truly mind boggling, and the expense of fielding large, technologically sophisticated, mechanized forces all but inconceivable. Despite this, incredibly, according to Leahy’s memo, “Economy in the use of time and in money cost is comparatively unimportant”. What mattered to Truman was that he “make his decisions on the campaign with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives.” (This is exactly what one would expect from this combat veteran President. The old artillery captain had seen war first hand less than thirty years before; he had even tried to volunteer for service in World War II and was turned down by General Marshall. Truman was a senator at the time he asked to serve and was quickly put in charge of the US Senate War Investigating Committee, which would go on to save millions of taxpayer dollars by policing against profiteering by weapons contractors.)

Exactly what casualty figures Truman was given at his meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 18 has become a matter of confused debate. The first source of confusion was the previously mentioned communication involving Marshall and MacArthur between June 14 and June 18. Marshall first sent a message to MacArthur on June 16 asking for “the estimate you are using for planning purposes of battle casualties in OLYMPIC up to D + 90.” MacArthur replied that in the first 30 days, he expected that his forces would suffer 50,800 men killed and wounded, another 27,150 in days 30 through 60, and a further 17,100 in days 60 through 90. He added that “the foregoing are estimated total battle casualties from which estimated return to duty numbers are deducted. Not included…are non battle casualties which are estimated at 4200 for each 30 day period.” MacArthur, then, expected that over 100,000 Americans would be killed or wounded in the battle for Kyushu alone. It appears that he did not realize at first just how significant the June 18 meeting would prove to be, because this comparatively blithe reply was immediately questioned by Marshall. On the 18th, just a few hours prior to the meeting, Marshall sent the following to MacArthur: “The President is very much concerned as to the number of casualties we will receive in the OLYMPIC operation. This will be discussed with the President about 3:30 PM today Washington time. Is the estimate given in your (message) of 50,800 for the period of D to D + 30 based on plans for medical installations to be established or is it your best estimate of the casualties you anticipate from the operational viewpoint. Please rush your answer.” MacArthur now tried to spin his earlier estimate by saying it had been “for medical and replacement planning purposes” and “a routine report”. He added, “The estimate is purely academic and routine…It had not come to my prior attention. I do not anticipate such a high rate of loss. I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating wasteful operations of a nondecisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in OLYMPIC. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties.”

In addition to MacArthur’s estimate, there was at least one other formal report prepared for Truman by the same Joint War Plans Committee that was responsible for the plans for DOWNFALL itself. This was a Top Secret “Memorandum for the President, Subject: Campaign Against Japan”, dated June 15....It was estimated that in the two invasions, 40,000 Americans would die on the beaches, aboard ships, and further inland. Another 150,000 would be wounded, and 3,500 would go missing in action. The total figure was a staggering 193,500. The report also gave alternate figures for a campaign against Kyushu alone; in this case, 25,000 would die, 105,000 would be wounded, and 2,500 missing. In the worst case scenario, where there would be two Kyushu landings (the initial landing on the southern tip of the island and a second in the north) followed by the final assault on Tokyo, it would be 46,000 dead, 170,000 wounded, and 4,000 missing. It should be added that deaths due to accident and disease were not included in these estimates. Disease was a real possibility with Japan’s public health breaking down as its cities burned; there were as many as 13,000,000 survivors of LeMay’s “slaughter bombing” campaign (as the Japanese termed it) who were now homeless, and in their squatters’ lean-tos and general filth, malaria and tuberculosis raged.

Another factor that was sure to drive up the total of dead and maimed Americans was the certainty that a disproportionate number of the OLYMPIC troops would be green rookies. It was common knowledge that many European veterans considered their job finished. Talk among some of them was near mutinous, and besides, under a point system that awarded credit for time served, most of these troops and pilots were long since past the cutoff number for getting out, which was 85. That some of them would be refused their promised exit from the armed services was a foregone conclusion, but many were already heading back to civilian life with the close of the war in Europe, and the Army in particular was loathe to but the brakes on too many of these men. Army planners stated bluntly that the loss of these veterans “would mean loss of lives and battle efficiency.”

Another casualty estimate came from Admiral Leahy. Leahy used the loss rates from the Okinawa invasion to extrapolate figures for the OLYMPIC force. Of the total force, Army, Navy, Marines, and Army Air Forces involved at Okinawa, 12,520 soldiers, sailors, and Marines were killed. 36,631 were wounded, which meant according to American reckoning that they were hurt badly enough to be out of combat for more than a week. These 49,151 casualties were about 35 percent of the total force involved. Assuming the same rate on Kyushu, Leahy’s estimate came to more than 250,000, with 65,000 KIA (Killed In Action). This put him somewhat at odds with MacArthur and his claim that Kyushu’s much larger setting would allow greater maneuver and thus avoid some of the head on attacks of the Okinawa campaign, though of course MacArthur’s figures still predicted horrific casualties. On the other hand, it would be hard to imagine that Japanese defenders would fight less hard or skillfully or fanatically on their home soil than they had at Okinawa, even if the preinvasion bombardment would be orders of magnitude greater. It must be remembered, too, that the Japanese 32nd Army on Okinawa was actually missing about half of its stockpiled ammunition---destroyed in an accidental explosion at a supply dump ---as well as its best unit, the 9th Infantry Division. This force was to have been positioned at the very heart of Japanese defenses on Okinawa, while other units charged the beaches as the Americans were trying to offload their men and equipment. Imperial General Headquarters miscalculated American intentions and in December 1944 sent the 9th Division to Formosa, from where it was to go to the Philippines. As it turned out, this crack 25,000 man unit would spend the rest of the war rotting away on Formosa because the high command feared submarine attack on the 9th’s transport ships if they tried to complete their journey. As hard as it is to fathom, Japanese resistance on Okinawa would have been even more formidable if the 32nd Army had not been deprived of these experienced soldiers. Applying the absence of the 9th Division on Okinawa to Leahy’s estimates of the casualties on Kyushu, then, means that the awful figures presented to Truman on June 18 were, if anything, probably much too low.

Americans would not be the only ones to die in the orgy of destruction. Japanese losses would be enormous. To continue with the Okinawa comparison, the force defending the 875 square miles of that island, the 32nd Army, was completely destroyed. Over 72,000 soldiers were killed, along with more than 30,000 Okinawans who had either been drafted into the Army or were serving as auxiliaries in one role or another. Only a few hundred were captured alive, many of them months or even years later as they wandered in from the countryside more dead than anything else. The kill ratio, then, was about ten to one. This would mean a minimum of 250,000 dead Japanese on Kyushu, and probably many more than that, given the Japanese buildup, the incredible firepower that America, Britain, and Australia were assembling for OLYMPIC, and the certainty that many Japanese civilians and paramilitaries would have charged into the fray to die “honorably”. In fact, Japan was planning to expend all of its remaining military assets against OLYMPIC, except for the defenses of Tokyo itself. Preparations for Ketsu Go (Operation Decision) were well underway. According to American intelligence, American attackers would be faced by 350,000 Japanese troops, not counting huge numbers of paramilitary volksturm-style units whose effectiveness would have varied but who would certainly have caused additional losses. This was the accepted figure on June 18. It was much too low. More and more men and equipment were pouring into Kyushu all the time, even in the face of American air supremacy (which of course destroyed some of these forces and their transportation). Japanese forces on Kyushu actually built up to almost 600,000 troops by late July. On July 29, MacArthur’s own intelligence organization, known as G-2, said, “The rate and probable continuity of Japanese reinforcements into the Kyushu area are changing that tactical and strategical situation sharply. At least six (6) additional major units have been picked up in June/July; it is obvious that they are coming in from adjacent areas over lines of communication that have apparently not been seriously affected by air strikes. There is a strong likelihood that additional major units will enter the area before the target date; we are engaged in a race against time by which the ratio of attack effort vis-à-vis defense capacity is perilously balanced. Unless the use of these routes is restricted by air and/or naval action…enemy forces in Southern Kyushu may be still further augmented until our planned local superiority is overcome, and the Japanese will enjoy complete freedom of action in organizing the area and in completing their preparations for defense.” Marshall was so worried by this buildup that he suggested MacArthur consider other landing sites; alternatives proposed in this “eyes only” message included the city of Sendai, 180 miles north of Tokyo, the town of Ominato, located on Mutsu Bay on the northern tip of Honshu, and Tokyo itself. MacArthur rejected this notion because he felt that American air power would prove decisive against even a large Japanese buildup and in any case felt that taking the southernmost home island was critical because only then could local, land based air power be used in the final assault on Tokyo to the north. It is doubtful MacArthur really had a good grasp of just how many enemy personnel his forces would face. Japan was “systematically mobilizing a vast manpower pool---in addition to its military force---of 13.3 million males aged 15 to 59….Special Guard Forces, made up mostly of men who had some previous military training…were attached to major units primarily for such non-combat duties as fortification building, transport, and “casualty clearing” on the battlefield.” But of course all of these would be expected to fight; every man, woman, and child would be infantry in the end. In fact, Japanese plans were even more explicit than this. On April 20, Imperial Army General Headquarters issued its “Decree of the Homeland Decisive Battle”, which said in its opening statement, “We shall throw everything conceivable, material and spiritual, into the battle and annihilate the enemy landing force by fierce and bold offensive attacks.” “Everything conceivable” would include the last remnants of the Imperial Navy, that is, about 20 destroyers and 40 to 60 fleet submarines, none of them with any more fuel than for a one way ride to glory; 540 five man midget submarines and at least 360 two man midgets; and hundreds of suiciders that were nothing more than warheads mounted on speedboats. (Though of course, all of the seagoing units were really suiciders.) There were even hundreds of suicide divers, whose task was to swim out from their underwater warrens and fling their explosives-laden bodies directly underneath oncoming landing craft. From the skies would come as many as 10,500 kamikazes who would expend all of their strength over the first ten days of battle. That Japan was husbanding its last ergs of strength for the OLYMPIC assault is evidenced by the fact that during the combined air and battleship bombardments of July and August, 1945, the Japanese rarely even tried to mount any effective naval or air opposition, not even kamikazes.

The entire strategy from top to bottom was, in fact, suicide by Western standards, but according to Major General Masakazu Amano, chief of the Army operations section at Imperial General Headquarters, “…we were absolutely sure of victory. It was the first and only battle in which the main strength of the air, land, and sea forces were to be joined. The geographical advantages of the homeland were to be utilized to the highest degree, the enemy was to be crushed, and we were confident that the battle would prove to be the turning point in political maneuvering.” A July 1945 IGHQ memo reflected this thinking, stating hopefully that Japan’s last throw of the dice would produce at least a million US casualties---even if it cost an equal or greater number of Japanese. The hoped for result would be “public opinion in America (becoming) inclined towards peace…with comparatively advantageous conditions.”

In other words, the Japanese plan was to force a favorable negotiated peace on Japanese terms, and any amount of bloodshed was simply the necessary price.

In a footnote, I added the following, which in my view is much the more likely outcome:

The figure of 250,000 Japanese dead is based on the low end Joint Chiefs estimate of 25,000 American combat deaths, times ten, again using the approximate Okinawa kill ratio of ten to one extrapolated onto the Kyushu landing. However, the following factors must be kept in mind when calculating likely OLYMPIC-Ketsu Go casualties. First, the JCS figure was based on the assumption that opposing Japanese forces would number 350,000, when in reality they would have been nearly twice that size, not counting air and sea kamikaze, quasi-military, and nominally civilian assets. Second, very few Japanese, especially regular Army and especially on their home ground, would ever have surrendered or been captured alive. Third, American and Allied supporting firepower (especially naval and air) would have been the very greatest possible within the framework of existing technology and logistics. There were also contingency plans to employ poison gas, especially if IGHQ had resorted to such weapons. (See Allen and Polmar, 172-191.) All in all, the real figures would certainly have amounted to better than 500,000 Japanese killed in action, and American casualties would also have been much worse than the JCS predicted.

With all of this taken into account, I don't know how anyone can argue that the atomic bombings were not the fastest and most humane (in terms of lives lost) means of ending the War. --- WJP

[WilliamJPellas]

I am going to go ahead and add this factual correction to my earlier post regarding the WWII German and Japanese atomic bomb projects. I'm doing this as an additional post rather than as an edit to the original because for some reason the "Edit Post" button refuses to come up no matter how many times I log in or refresh the page! :banghead:
Anyway, the graphite-moderated reactor the Americans built at Oak Ridge was the X-10, not the Y-12 as I had indicated. Y-12 was the designation for the electromagnetic uranium separation plant. Apologies for any confusion.

[nice gaijin]

edits are only available within (I think) 24 hours of the time you post, which is why you weren't able to change a 4 month old post. Considering how long your mistake went unnoticed let alone responded to, I think you could consider yourself "in the clear" on this one ;)

[WilliamJPellas]

I much appreciate that, Gaijin, and by the way, cool cat you have there! I just wanted to be sure I had everything factually correct, in particular because there are those in the politically-charged atmosphere of atomic scholarship who would try to make great hay from any error, no matter how small or benign it might be. Plus, it's just good policy for any scholar. But again, thanks for the kind words!

[dangdaga]

Sorry to be on your back about this mikecash. Could go into further detail about how, you feel that the dropping of the atomic bomb, can be justified

[Mike Cash]

Sorry to be on your back about this mikecash. Could go into further detail about how, you feel that the dropping of the atomic bomb, can be justified


Do you mean to ask me how I think it can be justified? Or how I think there are many Japanese alive today who owe their lives to the atomic bombs? Or how I think the atomic bombs turned out to be a huge favor to the nation of Japan?

[Sensuikan San]

Sorry to be on your back about this mikecash. Could go into further detail about how, you feel that the dropping of the atomic bomb, can be justified


Are you asking Mikecash to justify the act, based on the moralistic outlook of 2006 ... or the morals, outlook and historical perspective of 1945?

There are differences ....

ジョン

[irishlight42]

I think dropping the bomb on Hiroshima was probably justified, mostly due to the only real alternative of actually landing in and invading Japan.

HOWEVER, dropping the bomb on Nagasaki could have at least waited. Furthermore, if a bomb was to be dropped anywhere, Nagasaki really probably wasn't the best target as it was not the industrial center it has sometimes been claimed to be. I also find it interesting that Nagasaki was in fact home to much of Japan's limited Christian population of the time (which was then largely wiped out thanks to the bomb).

The main thing is though, the U.S. did not wait for a response to Hiroshima before dropping the bomb on Nagasaki, it came TOO SOON after. With the slightest bit of negotiation, Nagasaki MIGHT (though I suppose we don't know for sure; a lot of generals still wanted to fight after the both bombs were dropped, though a lot of politicians did not) have been totally unnecessary for the surrender of Japan. If not, however, then the U.S. would still have that second bomb ready to use.

[gaijinalways]

Interesting thread, war is cruel and unforgiving. Dropping the bombs saved having to invade mainland Japan. Now compared to the uranium waste enriched bombs dropped in Iraq by the US (with the full knowledge of what radiation does avaiable), the former event seems like a worse crime, as what did the Iraqis do to us (besides invading one of our oil sorces, Kuwait, that is)?

[irishlight42]

as what did the Iraqis do to us (besides invading one of our oil sorces, Kuwait, that is)?

Exactly.... :flame:

EDIT: Ye, Bush basically wants to help his rich buddies....

[Ost Prussia]

Dirty rotten MURDERERS! Women and children...

[Blututh]

All wars are crimes, if you were ordered to shoot someone in the head, and followed your superior's orders, does it matter if you were American, German, Italian, British, Russian, or Japanese? It is always difficult to justify war, but making an example of the use of atomic bombs is not very logical. They[nuclear weapons] are just another step in the evolution of weapons, just as spears, swords, metal armor, and guns were. The argument would be similar to saying that if everyone in the world used swords and metal armor to fight, and you had a gun and some grenades, that you are a war criminal but they are not.

[Ost Prussia]

Muskets and Armor have never blow up a quarter of a Million people....

[sabro]

I think the timing of the second bomb was meant to communicate to Japan that we had a lot of these things and we could keep dropping them every week if necessary.

[Mike Cash]

Muskets and Armor have never blow up a quarter of a Million people....

Not all at once, no.

(So who uses muskets anymore?)

[caster51]

at first,Japan succeeded in the development of the atomic bomb earlier than the United States.
The emperor did not grant the permission of the manufacturing.
He said "I do not want to win a war after that manner."

[Mike Cash]

at first,Japan succeeded in the development of the atomic bomb earlier than the United States.
The emperor did not grant the permission of the manufacturing.
He said "I do not want to win a war after that manner."

You're delusional.

[caster51]

You're delusional.
I think you dont know at all .
you are a fool
天皇は終戦を迎える前に、戦争放棄の伏線とも言える発 言をしています。日本はアメリカより前に原子爆弾の研 究をすすめ、終戦前には完成させていました。日本の敗 色が濃厚になってきた頃、杉平将軍が天皇のところへそ れを報告に行きました。「研究の結果、原爆が完成して います。戦争に勝利するために使いたいと思っています が、いかがでしょうか」
「人間が死ぬだけでなく、草木も生えなくなるような、 そんな恐ろしいものを使ってまで、戦争に勝つ必要はな い。そんな研究は即刻やめるように」天皇のこのひと言 で、日本の原爆開発は中止されました。もし日本が原爆 をそのままつくり続けていたら、連合国側も日本側も、 さらなる犠牲を生んでいた可能性が高い。戦後日本では、天皇の戦 争責任を追及し、天皇制を否定する人々もある。しかし 天皇は最後まで開戦に反対し、何とかして戦争を回避し ようとしていたという。だからこそ東条英機が首相にな ったのである。
there was already uranium to make A-Bomd in Japan before WW2 by Kodama organs
The WWII era was a time of tremendous change, conflict, fear, prejudice, hatred, and anger. The initial research of the atomic bomb began before the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese on Dec.
http://www.unm.edu/~abqteach/atomicamerica/00-01-04.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoshio_Kodama
kodama organ
児玉機関
しかし1938年に日中戦争が始まると、外務省情報部の懇 意の人物を通して採用され、その後海軍航空本部の嘱託 となった。1941年、31歳の児玉は上海に「児玉機関」と 呼ばれる店を出した。これは、タングステンやラジウム 、コバルト、ニッケルなどの戦略物資を買い上げ、海軍 航空本部に納入する仕事だった
http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%85%90%E7%8E%89%E8%AA%89%E5%A3%AB%E5%A4%AB

Japan started the research of an atomic bomb earlier than the United States
It had been completed before the end of the war.
then one general asked Emperor " we are ready to make A-bomd for victory......."
Emperor said
"Man not only dies but also the plant doesn't grow either. Japan need not win a war by using such frightening arms." then Japan gave up to make that
Tojo said
東條首相は、陛下のご意思に反することはできないとい うことであったが、自分としては敗戦となれば日本が滅 びてしまい元も子もなくなると考え、製造促進を主張し 意見が衝突した。参謀総長の立場にある者として、日本 を敗戦に導くことはできない。戦争とは結果において勝 利を得ることが肝要であり、今の日本は手段を云々できるときではない。勝てば陛下にお喜びいただける に違いない
http://echoo.yubitoma.or.jp/weblog/ys716/eid/43657
It is very famous though this is a secret story.

[Ryuhou]

Has anyone heard about how the dropping affected the Enola Gay crew's psyche? My father used to tell me stories of some of them going absolutely crazy because of remorse - one of them was supposed to go wacko and started living on a tree. I can't find (no wonder) anything about that in the internet. i mean, there were only people and the dropping must have had a devastating effect on some of them..

[Mike Cash]

Has anyone heard about how the dropping affected the Enola Gay crew's psyche? My father used to tell me stories of some of them going absolutely crazy because of remorse - one of them was supposed to go wacko and started living on a tree. I can't find (no wonder) anything about that in the internet. i mean, there were only people and the dropping must have had a devastating effect on some of them..

I once knew a girl who said her father told her the Japanese use snake urine for salad dressing.